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ANONYMITY, FACEPRINTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Kimberly N. Brown' 
INTRODUCTION 
Rapid technological advancement has dramatically expanded the war-
rantless powers of government to obtain information about individual citi-
zens directly from the private domain. Biometrics technology I-such as 
voice recognition, hand measurement, iris and retinal imaging, and facial 
recognition technology ("FRT")-offers enormous potential for law en-
forcement and national security. But it comes at a cost. Although much of 
the American public is complacent with government monitoring for securi-
ty reasons,2 people also expect to go about daily life in relative obscurity-
unidentifiable to others they do not already know, do not care to know, or 
are not required to know-so long as they abide by the law. The reality is 
quite different. The government and the private sector have the capacity for 
surveillance of nearly everyone in America. As one commentator puts it, 
"soon there really will be nowhere to run and nowhere to hide, short of liv-
ing in a cave, far removed from technology."3 
FRT is a major contributor to the spectre of an Orwellian society.4 Fa-
cebook uses it to identify "friends" from uploaded photos, which are per-
manently affixed in cyberspace5 and accessible to the government.6 Federal 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Cornell; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan. Thanks to Garrett Epps, Michele Gilman, Steve Grossman, Dave Jaros, Dionne 
Koller, C.J. Peters, and Colin Starger for comments on prior versions of this Article, and to Jillian 
Bokey, Andrew Geraghty, and Ben Bor for research assistance. 
I The field of biometrics encompasses numerous methodologies for identifying humans by their 
biological or behavioral characteristics or traits. See Biometrics, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarylbiometrics (last visited Nov. 16,2013). 
2 Dana Blanton, Fox News Poll: Mixed Views on NSA Surveillance Program, FoxNEWS.COM 
(June 25, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/20 13/06125/fox-news-poll-mixed-views-on-nsa-
surveillance-program/. 
3 John W. Whitehead, Smile, the Government Is Watching: Next Generation identification, 
RIGHT SIDE NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012, 12:07 PM), http://www.rightsidenews.com/2012091717049/ 
editorial/us-opinion-and-editorial/smile-the-government-is-watching-next-generation-identification. 
htm!. 
4 See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 5, 169-70 (New Am. Library 1983) (\ 949). 
5 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
6 See James Risen, Report Indicates More Extensive Cooperation by Microsoft on Surveillance, 
N.Y. TIMES (July II, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/uslreport-indicates-more-extensive-
cooperation-by-microsoft-on-surveillance.html (reporting on internal NSA documents indicating that 
"Microsoft had helped the security agency find ways to circumvent its encryption on its Outlook.com 
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and state authorities have their own databases of images collected from 
drivers' licenses, public surveillance cameras, unmanned aerial drones, and 
tiny recording devices attached to police uniforms.7 Currently, the FBI is 
working on a $1 billion effort to expand its fingerprint identification system 
to cross-reference FRT and other biometric data against a vast data reposi-
tory that includes some 13 million criminal mug shot photos.8 With FRT, a 
federal agent or corporate marketer can convert any number of these facial 
images into algorithms, associate them with countless other bits of personal 
data accumulating throughout the global information network, and track the 
most intimate details of an unsuspecting person's daily life. 
There is no recognized constitutional theory for placing boundaries on 
the government's ability to engage in ubiquitous monitoring of citizens 
based on images snapped in public or posted online. The Supreme Court 
has made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not protect "[w]hat a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public."9 Nor does it cover information re-
vealed to third parties. IO Thus, although corporations and individual citizens 
generate the largest storehouses of personal data today, the government-
through its subpoena powers, contractual agreements, and public access to 
online data--can effectively bootstrap private information into its own do-
main without contending with the Constitution. 
As a consequence, technology has minimized the Constitution's im-
portance as a mechanism for protecting against arbitrary government track-
ing of one's movements, habits, relationships, interests, and thoughts. This 
Article attempts to reassert the Constitution's relevance when it comes to 
surveillance through FRT and related technologies in two ways. First, it 
argues for recognition of anonymity as a constitutional value that is both 
implicit in the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and explicit in its 
First Amendment jurisprudence. Second, it suggests that a shift in technol-
ogy's intersection with data-from analysis of static bits of information in 
the pre-digital age to a "growing respect for correlations" among data in the 
digital age-warrants a fresh look at Fourth Amendment doctrine that ex-
portal's encrypted Web chat function," given the agency "access to e-mail," and "provided the F.B.I. 
with access to its SkyDrive service"). 
7 Whitehead, supra note 3 (discussing surveillance drones and noting that "[p]olice departments 
across the country are now being equipped with the Mobile Offender Recognition and Information 
System, or MORIS, a physical iPhone add-on that allows officers patrolling the streets to scan the irises 
and faces of individuals and match them against government databases"); see also JAY STANLEY & 
CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 6-8 (2011), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfi"omaerialsurveillance.pdf; Carol Cratty, FBI Uses 
Drones for Surveillance in u.s., CNN.COM (June 20, 2013, 7:27 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/0611 9/politics/tbi-drones. 
8 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
10 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
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cuses surveillance based on infonnation obtained in public or from third 
parties." FRT allows users to correlate numerical faceprint algorithms with 
other data points to create new infonnation relating to an individual's past, 
present, and future life. '2 Constitutional law must account for this modern 
capacity to manipulate data for predictive intelligence. To this end, the Ar-
ticle derives doctrinal guidelines for grappling with technology's threat to 
the constitutional value of anonymity from a reconciliation of the Fourth 
and First Amendment law bearing on the issue. 
Part I defines anonymity and explains that respect for the capacity to 
remain physically and psychologically unknown to the government traces 
back to the Founding. With the advent and expansion of new technologies 
such as FRT, the ability to remain anonymous has eroded, leading to a lita-
ny of possible hanns. 
Part II reviews the existing Fourth and First Amendment doctrine that 
is available to stave off ubiquitous government surveillance and identifies 
anonymity as a constitutional value that warrants more explicit doctrinal 
protection. Although the Fourth Amendment has been construed to excise 
surveillance of public and third-party infonnation from its scope, the 
Court's recent jurisprudence indicates a growing recognition that constitu-
tional doctrine is out of step with modern surveillance technologies. The 
Supreme Court has expressly recognized a First Amendment right to anon-
ymous speech, which should be taken into account in assessing the constitu-
tionality of government surveillance systems under the Fourth Amendment. 
This Part accordingly draws a distinction between cases that arose in the 
pre-digital age, in which content was often collected through physical tres-
pass or eavesdropping, and those arising in the digital age, in which correla-
tions among disparate points of "big data" are used to make predictions. 
Part III argues that Fourth and First Amendment doctrine should be 
reconciled to address the manipulation-versus acquisition--ofFRT data to 
derive new infonnation about individuals which is exceedingly intimate and 
otherwise out of the government's reach. This Part suggests that this quali-
tative shift in infonnation gathering is constitutionally significant under 
existing doctrine. Part III also offers guidelines gleaned from the intersec-
tion of First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for consideration by 
lower courts and legislators as they address the threat of limitless surveil-
lance which big data and new technologies present. 
II VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 19 (20[3). 
12 See Christopher S[obogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 3 [7,323 (2008). 
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I. THE PUBLIC VALUE OF ANONYMITY 
In 1964, a commentator observed that one day "automated society 
[might] look upon privacy with the same air of amused nostalgia we now 
reserve for, say, elaborate eighteenth-century drawing room manners."13 
Numerous modern scholars have similarly declared that privacy "is in 'per-
il,' 'distress,' or 'danger."'14 Much has been written about the need to adapt 
Fourth Amendment law to accommodate modern infringements on privacy 
interests. 15 As this Part explains, FRT focuses particular attention on one 
aspect of privacy-the ability to manage and retain one's anonymity. This 
Part defines anonymity and attempts to place it in some historical context. 
Although American colonists lived under the constant gaze of their com-
munities, they abhorred the officious prying of British authorities. They 
also robustly engaged in anonymous speech. This Part goes on to describe 
modern-day FRT and the threat it poses to privacy in the twenty-first centu-
ry. In short, technology has put in jeopardy a value that most Americans 
take for granted-the ability to carry on largely incognito, if we so choose. 
A. Anonymity Defined 
Privacy is a vague notion that means different things to different peo-
ple in various contexts. 16 Scholars have painstakingly developed taxono-
mies for privacy, parsing its subcomponents in an effort to develop a more 
accurate vocabulary for debate and analysis. 17 Two conceptions of privacy 
are particularly accessible to most laypeople. IB Informational privacy is the 
13 MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 225 (1964). Justice Brandeis observed in his 
Olmstead dissent that "[ w]ays may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing 
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
14 DANIELJ. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 5 (2008). 
15 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths 
and the Case/or Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801,802-04 & n.7 (2004) (noting that "[t]he view that the 
Fourth Amendment should be interpreted broadly in response to technological change has been em-
braced by leading theorists of law and technology" and citing numerous law review articles regarding 
the same). 
16 Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy and Security 0/ Personal Itiformation: Economic incentives and 
Technological Solutions, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY 179 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen 
Lewis eds., 2004); see generally SOLOVE, supra note 14, at ix, I ("There is no overarching conception 
of privacy-it must be mapped like terrain, by painstakingly studying the landscape .... Currently, 
privacy is a sweeping concept, encompassing (among other things) freedom of thought, control over 
one's body, solitude in one's home, control over personal information, freedom from surveillance, 
protection of one's reputation, and protection from searches and interrogations."). 
17 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy o/Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 483-84 (2006). 
18 Professor Anita Allen distinguishes the two primary usages of the term "privacy" as, on the one 
hand, "conditions of restricted access," including anonymity, physical separation or isolation from 
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interest in "avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and controlling one's 
own personal infonnation, which the Supreme Court has suggested is con-
stitutionally protected when gathered and held by the government. 19 Today, 
the term often relates to information stored on computer systems, such as 
medical records, financial data, criminal records, political records, business-
related information, and online data.20 Physical privacy has traditionally 
been equated with the protection of one's person or physical space, such as 
a home or vehicle. Violations of physical privacy can trigger Fourth 
Amendment and/or common law scrutiny.21 People intrinsically appreciate 
the need for legal limits on the ability of the government and others to in-
vade one's home or body absent consent. 
Related to both informational and physical privacy-but less salient in 
the collective mind of the public-is the concept of anonymity: the state of 
hiding in plain sight from the government so long as one abides by the rule 
of law. Anonymity is the freedom from being identified and tracked by 
name while going through the motions of daily life, including physical 
movement in private and public spaces, the transaction of business online, 
and the maintenance of personal and professional relationships, habits, and 
beliefs-however unpopular or repugnant. 22 Anonymity enables one to re-
others, and information nondisclosure, and, on the other hand, privacy as liberty-that is, "freedom from 
governmental or other outside interference with decisionmaking and conduct, especially respecting 
appropriately private affairs." Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy. Private Choice. and Social 
Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 464-66 (1987) (footnotes omitted); cf Robert C. Post, Three 
Concepts of Privacy, 89 Gw. LJ. 2087, 2092 (2001) (discussing privacy as control of knowledge, a 
protector of dignity-which is most relevant to the Fourth Amendment-and a means of implementing 
freedom). In this Article, only the restricted access form of privacy is at issue under Professor Allen's 
rubric. 
19 See NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2011) ("We assume, without deciding, that the 
Constitution protects [such] a privacy right .... "); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 
(1977) (characterizing such interest as "[o]ne element of privacy"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977) (noting that the Court's privacy cases have implicated "the individual interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters" as well as "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions"). 
20 Scholars have divided data collection into subcategories, including "tool data," which encom-
passes data-such as social security numbers and dates of birth-that is valued for its utility versus its 
content; "biographical data," which is "the product of ... behavior in public places" and includes resi-
dence, routines, and friends; and "transactional data," which is information generated by interactions 
with professionals such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers, as well as vendors of goods and services. 
Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. I, 54 
n.247 (2005) (citing sources). 
21 A third foundational prong of privacy is decisional privacy, or the right to make fundamental 
decisions-such as the use of contraception methods-without governmental interference. See Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
22 Anonymity is a conception of privacy which may be captured in the literature under different 
names. Cf SOLOVE, supra note 14, at ix, I (identifying freedom from surveillance as a concept em-
braced by the term). 
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main undifferentiated in public. In literal terms, it means "nameless."23 As 
Justice Sotomayor suggested in United States v. Jones,24 the everyday oc-
currences for which anonymity is appreciated "take[] little imagination to 
conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the 
AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-
the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the 
gay bar and on and on."25 In protecting against government access to one's 
physical whereabouts, anonymity shelters private information about one's 
thoughts, relationships, and plans for the future. 26 It fosters the capacity to 
control or limit access to "one's intimate relationships or aspects of life"27 
and, accordingly, to exclude others from the very "consciousness of the 
mind."28 
In the late eighteenth century, philosopher Jeremy Bentham famously 
unveiled his "panopticon" design for institutional buildings, which con-
tained a central tower surrounded by a perimeter of backlit cells from which 
inmates could not see their surveyors.29 Bentham described the design as 
"[a] new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind," as a single guard 
could theoretically control all of the prisoners simultaneously.30 As French 
philosopher Michel Foucault later explained, the prisoners would internal-
ize the presumption that they are being watched and modify their behavior 
to comply with expectations,3) rendering the guards virtually superfluous. 
Legal theorists who have studied the panopticon effect posit that 
"[a]nonymity in public promotes freedom of action and an open society," 
while a "[l]ack of public anonymity promotes conformity and an oppressive 
23 Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to 
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 238 (2002). 
24 \32 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
25 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 
2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Taken to the extreme, true autonomy is the ability to hide from others without a trace. It has 
some positive value, such as in the situation where government informants assume a new identity for 
their own protection. It is also problematic to the extent that it enables wrongdoers to evade responsibil-
ity for their actions. See generally Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: 
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641-43 (1995). In the online 
environment, "[aJnonymity can be used to violate another's privacy." Id. at 1661 (quoting Posting ofL. 
Detweiler, Id231782@longs.1ance.colostate.edu, to alt.privacy et al. (Sept. 20, 1993), available at 
http://www.websteruniv.edul-bumbaughlnetlnet-anon.pt2). 
27 SOLOVE, supra note 14, at \3. 
28 Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 268 (1977). 
29 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 35 (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995). 
30 Id. at3!. 
31 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195,201 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
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society"32 in which "majoritarian authority will coerce citizens into silence 
or acquiescence."33 
Although Bentham never built his panopticon, the association of pri-
vacy with anonymity from the government later appeared in the writings of 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, who in 1890 recognized "the right to 
be let alone"34 as an important defmitional component of privacy and one 
that has since become "the foundation of privacy law in the United 
States."35 In the twentieth century, Professor William Prosser similarly 
identified intrusions upon a person's seclusion or solitude as a distinct kind 
of privacy invasion against which the law should provide protection.36 
Social science research suggests that contemporary Americans view 
the ability to move about in public or online without being tracked as an 
important aspect of privacy.37 Surveys indicate that Internet users perceive 
an invasion of privacy when their web-surfing information is collected and 
shared with other parties.38 People especially want to maintain a meaningful 
degree of independence from the government when it comes to personal 
thoughts and communications with others. Even before online technology 
took hold, survey respondents ranked the monitoring of phone calls for thir-
ty days and the reading of a personal diary as more intrusive than the gov-
ernment's withdrawal of blood.39 An area of particular public concern is 
video surveillance, which may arouse fears of rigid and arbitrary law en-
32 Siobogin, supra note 23, at 240. 
33 Jonathan Turley, Registering Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, CATO 
SUP. CT. REV. 2001-2002, at 57, 75-76, 82. Jonathan Turley has identified six additional benefits of 
anonymity in the area of free speech: (I) protecting against persecution for unpopular speech; (2) pre-
venting disenfranchisement from public debate and participatory politics; (3) encouraging pluralistic 
value and thoughts; (4) protecting spontaneous speech which "is the type of speech that occurs between 
neighbors"; (5) enhancing privacy values by enabling people "to separate their personal home life from 
their public advocacy"; and (6) protecting Internet speech, in particular, as the looming "threat of gov-
ernment surveillance" makes the Internet a rare site of anonymous discourse that can "remain[] raw and 
uninhibited." ld. at 75·78; see also id. at 77, 83 (noting that loss of anonymity signifies a loss of free-
dom). 
34 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
35 So LOVE, supra note 14, at IS. The right to be left alone has been critiqued as too broad in and 
of itself. ld. at 18. "If privacy simply meant 'being let alone,' ... [aJ punch in the nose would be a 
privacy invasion as much as a peep in the bedroom." ld. (quoting ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: 
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
37 LISA S. NELSON, AMERICA IDENTIFIED: BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 94-97 (2011); 
see also Siobogin, supra note 23, at 273-86 (discussing earlier poll data on surveillance). 
38 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 622-29 
(2011). 
39 Christopher Siobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Au-
tonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted 
by Society," 42 DUKE LJ. 727, 737-39 (1993). 
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forcement by an omniscient state.40 National surveys and focus groups indi-
cate that "the threat of misuse of biometric identifiers [is] a point of concern 
and an obstacle to social acceptance" of such technologies.41 This attitude is 
reflected in survey participants' relative distaste for the use of biometric 
identification systems in public events like a professional football game, 
which was "viewed as a transgression of anonymity and decisional autono-
my without sufficient policy justification or assurance that the identification 
could be carried out with accuracy and reliability."42 
People appear to be more willing to tolerate privacy intrusions where 
the government's use of their personal information would foster their own 
well-being.43 The cost-benefit calculus imperceptibly performed around the 
acceptability of new technology, moreover, can be affected by the per-
ceived urgency of its public safety benefits. In the months after 9111, 51 
percent of people surveyed expressed greater trust in government than sur-
vey respondents did a year earlier.44 Respondents were also more comforta-
ble with decreased anonymity when biometric technology was used for 
boarding a plane, accessing government buildings, checking against a ter-
rorist watch list, or requiring background checks on foreigners. 45 In a 
CBSlNew York Times poll taken after the Boston Marathon attacks, 78 
percent of respondents endorsed the idea of having more public surveillance 
cameras such as those that helped identify the bombing suspects; only 20 
percent said that the government has gone too far in restricting civil liber-
ties in the battle against terrorism.46 
Anonymity is nonetheless something that Americans generally take for 
granted. People expect to be able to recede into a crowd or go unnoticed 
while walking down the street so long as they have nothing illegal to hide. 
At this juncture, there is "insufficient public awareness" about FRT, as well 
as "zero auditing mechanisms in place for any entity using the technolo-
gies."47 As a consequence, the public is unable to meaningfully perform a 
cost-benefit calculus regarding the government's use of new technologies 
for various forms of surveillance. They can only react when employment of 
40 Andrew W. Senior & Sharathchandra Pankanti, Privacy Protection and Face Recognition, in 
HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION 671, 672 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
41 NELSON, supra note 37, at 174. 
42 Id. at 118. 
43 See id. at 158. 
44 Id. at 157 (citing Robert Putnam, Bowling Together, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 18, 2002), 
http://prospect.orglarticlelbowling-together-O). 
45 Id. at 114-17. 
46 Rob Quinn, Poll: 78% Now OK with More Surveillance Cameras, NEWSER.COM (May 1,2013), 
http://www.newser.com/story/167141/poll-78-now-ok-with-more-surveillance-cameras.html. 
47 Violet Blue, Why You Should Be Worried About Facial-Recognition Technology, CNET.COM 
(Aug. 29, 2012, I :58 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1 023 _3-57502284-93/why-you-should-be-
worried-about-facial-recognition-technology/ (citing remarks by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse Director 
Beth Givens). 
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state-of-the-art surveillance methods makes headlines. In a separate 
CNN/Time poll taken two weeks after the Boston tragedy, 61 percent of 
respondents were more concerned about government expansion of anti-
terrorism policies that restrict civil liberties than they were about the gov-
ernment failing to enact new policies to fight terrorism. 48 As information 
technology continues to gain in intelligence and efficiency, it becomes in-
creasingly difficult for individuals to emerge from anonymity, engage in a 
non-anonymous transaction (such as withdrawing money from an ATM 
machine), and then return to anonymity. We live in an age in which people 
care deeply about privacy yet routinely provide information online in ex-
change for some perceived benefit,49 such as the ease of making a purchase 
transaction, or the social or professional networking that social media pro-
vides. Young people who have grown up with technology might not even 
conceive of a personal photo as private at all. 50 What many Americans fail 
to appreciate is that technology has put society on a trajectory whereby, 
even if the interiors of homes and bodies are kept private, and even if the 
law continues to protect against disclosures of certain categories of personal 
information, anonymity will soon become a relic of history. 51 
B. Anonymity Historically 
Personal privacy was hard to come by in colonial America.52 Colonial 
travelers shared beds with strangers due to the "practical necessity" of the 
"warmth and protection of a small groUp."53 The lack of ceilings in early 
homes enabled gawking from the roof beams. 54 Individuals were perceived 
primarily as part of a family or community, which collectively monitored 
48 Zeke J Miller, Poll: Americans More Concerned About Civil Liberties in Wake of Boston 
Bombing, TIME (May I, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/20 13/05/0 \/poll-americans-more-concerned-
about -ci vi I-Ii berties-i n-wake-of-boston-bombingl. 
49 SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 5. 
50 Anecdotally, when asked about privacy and the Internet, "[law] students argued strongly in 
favor ofa right to anonymity." Turley, supra note 38, at 75. 
51 JONATHAN FRANZEN, Imperial Bedroom, in How TO BE ALONE 39, 40 (2003) (observing that 
what is missing in the modem discussion of privacy and technology is "a genuinely alarmed public"). 
52 Brenner, supra note 20, at 41 (citing ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE: 
PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 17, 19 (2000)). 
53 DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 76 (1972). 
54 Brenner, supra note 20, at 41 (citing SMITH, supra note 52, at 19-20). "Even husbands and 
wives sometimes shared their bedrooms with lodgers or other members of the family." FLAHERTY, 
supra note 53, at 77. One woman who shared a bed with an unmarried couple later testified that "[t]he 
Bed was very Narrow on which they three were and thinks it almost if not wholly impossible that they 
should be guilty of that Crime [intercourse] without her knowledge and She observed no such thing." !d. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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members' habits and exerted pressure to conform.55 Newcomers to New 
England towns needed permission to settle there,56 and residents were re-
quired to register the names of overnight guests. 57 Colonial laws forbade 
residents from living alone or far from "the meeting house," or center of 
town, as was the practice in England.58 Court records show that Massachu-
setts homes were systematically searched in 1668 for single persons to be 
relocated with families.59 Opposition to solitary living "was motivated, not 
by lack of concern for privacy, but by traditions, practicality, and an under-
lying fear of sin."60 From the perspective of the church, living together as a 
family unit was the best arrangement for individuals and the community as 
a whole.61 By the eighteenth century, however, "New England society was 
prepared to accept the person who wanted to live alone because he enjoyed 
the privacy this way of living provided."62 
While living conditions afforded colonists little privacy, the pre-
technological world enabled greater privacy relative to the present day in 
other respects. Inevitably, reputational information was circulated as people 
moved about,63 but people could avoid eavesdropping by conducting con-
versations beyond the earshot of others.64 Business was transacted with 
scant written exchanges/5 and personal records consisted largely of diaries 
or letters.66 Only one person possessed a paper at any given time, and copies 
55 Brenner, supra note 20, at 40-41 (quoting GINI GRAHAM SCOlT, MIND YOUR OWN BUSINESS: 
THE BAlTLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY 24 (1995». 
56 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 170. Connecticut law from 1636 read that "no man that is neither 
married, nor hath any servant, nor is a publick Officer shall keep house of himself without consent of the 
Town where he lives." ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-Go-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE 
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 41 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57 SMITH, supra note 52, at 10. 
58 Brenner, supra note 20, at 41. 
59 SMITH, supra note 52, at 10; see a/so CHERLlN, supra note 56, at 41 (explaining, in the verbiage 
of the times, that selectmen ofa Massachusetts town met in the 1670s "to setel the younge persons in 
such families in the Town as is most sutable for thier good" (internal quotation marks omitted». 
60 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 175; see a/so CHERLIN, supra note 56, at 41 ("In part, these laws 
reflected the reality that living alone was nearly impossible in an environment where people needed 
family members to help them obtain the food, clothing, and shelter they needed to survive. "). 
61 SMITH, supra note 52, at 10. 
62 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 179 ('The residents of seventeenth-century New England regard-
ed the desire to live alone with suspicion. Morality and the economic interests of the state were better 
served if everyone lived in a family. Yet this was not an expression of total hostility to the value of 
privacy .... By the latter part of that century experience in America had shown that it was possible to 
live alone and not become a burden on the community."). 
63 Brenner, supra note 20, at 83. 
64 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 115 ("In colonial America, of course, conversations could only 
occur in the physical presence of someone else."). 
65 Brenner, supra note 20, at 82-83. 
66 fd. at 83. 
2014] ANONYMITY, F ACEPRINTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 419 
had to be painstakingly recreated.67 Individuals could control personal doc-
uments by securing them in a desk or cabinet in their own home. 
Moreover, "[d]espite the casualness of delivery, there seems to have 
been little premeditated and malicious perusal of other people's mail" in the 
seventeenth century.68 The Post Office Act of 1710 mandated that "No Per-
son or Persons shall presume wittingly, willingly, or knowingly, to open, 
detain, or delay ... any Letter or Letters, Packet or Packets."69 Colonists 
who were concerned about prying British authorities developed codes for 
encrypting their letters70 and used sealing wax and wrapping paper on pack-
ages.71 It was not until 1835 that postmasters attempted to monitor content 
in response to efforts by Southerners to make illegal the transmission of 
abolitionist literature through the mail.72 In Ex parte Jackson,73 the Supreme 
Court upheld a statute banning the transmission of lotteries via the mail, but 
noted that "[l]etters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully 
guarded from examination and inspection ... as if they were retained by the 
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles."74 Thus, when given the 
opportunity, the late-nineteenth-century Court upheld citizens' privacy in 
their personal mail. 
Although colonists lived in the public eye of their communities, the 
Framers forbid their newly formed American government from searching a 
person's private papers without first obtaining a warrant,75 a requirement 
that dates back to the English common law. 76 Whereas specific warrant pro-
visions were included in even the earliest state constitutions,77 the Fourth 
67 Id. (citing WALTER BESANT, LoNDON IN THE TIME OF THE STUARTS 53 (1903)) (describing 
seizure of the "papers" of James Howell, who was a suspected spy). 
68 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 119. 
69 Id. at 120 (quoting Post Office (Revenues) Act, 1710,9 Ann., c. II, § 41) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
70 See SMITH, supra note 52, at 25 ("For letter writers in the Colonial period, the consequences 
were serious if their writings were disclosed, especially if the messages appeared to defY the Crown or 
to be otherwise suspicious .... To be safe, letter writers developed means for preserving the confidenti-
ality of their correspondence [and] codes for disguising their words."); see also FLAHERTY, supra note 
53, at I 18 ("Others employed codes, shorthand, or nicknames when writing to friends, particularly on 
political topics."). 
71 FLAHERTY, supra note 53, at 118. 
72 Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 294 & n.203 (1986). 
73 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
74 Id. at 733. 
75 Brenner, supra note 20, at 83. 
76 See Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law 
Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of "Due Process of Law," 77 MISS. L.J. 
1,8(2007). 
77 See Hans A. Linde, State Constitutional Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 2495, 2496 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) ("Constitutional 
entrenchment of individual rights began with the earliest state constitutions . . . and is universal 
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Amendment came into effect as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791.78 The 
Supreme Court has deemed "the familiar history" of the Fourth Amendment 
as reflecting "a choice that our society should be one in which citizens 
'dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. "'79 Its "com-
mands grew in large measure out of the colonists' ... memories of the gen-
eral warrants formerly in use in England. These writs ... granted sweeping 
power to ... agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods."80 
Indeed, "aside from searches incident to arrest, such warrantless searches 
were not a large issue in colonial America."81 
While the warrant requirement was adopted to stave off the intrusive-
ness of the Crown, "anonymous speech flourished" in social and political 
life around the time that freedom of speech and freedom of association be-
came constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. 82 For the 
Founding Fathers, anonymity in the authorship of newspapers and pam-
phlets was central to attracting public support for the Revolution and for-
mation of an independent government without evoking British punish-
ment. 83 Although speech was strictly limited during the years of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts of 1798,84 the laws' constitutionality was the subject of 
much debate at the time.85 In a famous sedition trial in 1735, a printer re-
fused to reveal the authors of anonymous attacks on the Crown Governor of 
New York, an act which, according to Justice Thomas in his concurring 
opinion in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,86 "signified at an early 
moment the extent to which anonymity and the freedom of the press were 
intertwined in the early American mind."87 In 1788, Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, and John Jay published "the most famous example of the 
outpouring of anonymous political writing that occurred during the ratifica-
throughout the states, though the statements of rights differ. The common tradition includes ... freedom 
from warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures .... "). 
78 U.S. CaNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause .... "). 
79 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. 
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
80 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,7-8 (1977), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 
U.S. 565 (1991). 
81 [d. at 8. 
82 Turley, supra note 33, at 61. 
83 [d. at 58. 
84 See Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435,438 (2007) (describing how the Acts allowed for deporta-
tions of those considered aliens and criminalized political opposition to the government). 
85 See id. The statutes lapsed in 180 I, after which the Supreme Court declared that there was no 
federal jurisdiction over state law criminal charges for seditious libel. United States v. Hudson, II U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
86 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
87 [d. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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tion of the Constitution"88-the Federalist Papers. They used the pseudo-
nym "Publius" to disseminate the treasured constitutional writings, and 
signed others as "An American Citizen," "Marcus," and "Americanus."89 
Anonymous speech-and opposition to it--continued to playa central 
role in political discourse after Ratification. The Continental Congress fa-
mously attempted to identify an article by Benjamin Rush, who published 
his attack on members of Congress for inflation, embezzlement, and fraud 
under the name "Leonidas."90 When a Massachusetts delegate moved to 
require the article's printer to appear before Congress and discuss Leonidas, 
several members successfully opposed the motion on the grounds that it 
violated freedom of the press.91 Federalists and Anti-Federalists continuous-
ly sparred in essays written under fictitious names like "Caesar," "A Coun-
tryman/ "Fabius," and "Landowner" on the one hand and "Cato," "Bru-
tus," "Cincinnatus," and "Federal Farmer" on the other.92 James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton also used the famous pseudonyms "Helvidius" and 
"Pacificus" in debates over President Washington's decision to remain neu-
tral in the war between the British and the French.93 Scholars have surmised 
from these and other examples that "[t]he historical use of anonymous 
speech strongly suggests that the Framers originally viewed anonymity as a 
vital part of free speech and freedom of the press."94 
In the nineteenth century, new technologies for law enforcement 
emerged as cities increasingly faced crime and civil disobedience stemming 
from population growth, ethnic and racial tensions, and economic failures.95 
With the invention of the telegraph in 1844 and the telephone in 1876, elec-
88 Id. at 360; see generaJly Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a 
Source o/the Original Meaning o/the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007). 
89 Victoria Smith Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First 
Amendment, 8 COMM. L. & POL'y 405, 406 (2003); see also Turley, supra note 33, at 59. 
90 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 361 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Henry Laurens' 
Notes of Debate (July 3, 1779), in 13 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 139, 141 n.1 
(Paul H. Smith et al. cds., 1986». 
91 Id. at 362 (citin~ Dwight L. Teetcr, Press Freedom and the Public Printing: Pennsylvania, 
1775-83,45 JOURNALISM Q. 445, 451 (1968». 
92 Turley, supra note 33, at 59-60 & nn.II-23 (footnotes omitted) (identifYing who actually used 
these names, where possible). 
93 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 369 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 
I, June 29. 1793, in 15 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33-43 (H. Syrett ed. 1969); James 
Madison, Helvidius No. I, Aug. 24, 1793, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 66-73 (Thomas A. Ma-
son, Robert A. Rutland & Jeanne K. Sisson eds., 1985»; see also id. at 361-62 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(providing additional examples of anonymous speech). 
94 Turley, supra note 33, at 61. 
95 Craig D. Uchida, The Development of the American Police: An Historical Overview 8 (Dec. 
2004) (manuscript), available at http://storage.globalcitizen.net/data/topiC/knowledge/uploads/200904 
28151 I 4290.pdf. 
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tronic communication made individual surveillance much easier.96 In 1890, 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis bemoaned that "[i]nstantaneous photo-
graphs and newspaper enterprise [had] invaded the sacred precincts of pri-
vate and domestic life."97 With the advancement of photography, "amateurs 
[could] take 'candid' photographs, often clandestinely," in lieu of the pro-
longed professional sittings that preceded George Eastman's invention of 
the handheld camera in 1884, and newspapers came to thrive on "sin, sex 
and violence.''98 Wireless police radios,99 polygraphs,lOo and the use of fin-
gerprints for personal identification emerged in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 101 Law enforcement relied heavily on wiretapping to 
monitor social unrest caused by poor working conditions, World War I, and 
Prohibition. 102 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the government's techno-
logical powers for visual surveillance became more sophisticated, allowing 
it ''to peer into homes, high rise apartments, and commercial establish-
ments," as well as "remote private areas."i03 Night vision devices enabled 
long-range military surveillance,I04 and aerial mapping cameras allowed for 
precision topographical photography.l05 As Professor Daniel Solove has 
observed, it was "the profound proliferation of new information technolo-
96 DANIELJ. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 85 (2d 
ed. 2009); see also CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 
1940, at 71,225 (1992). 
97 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 34, at 195. 
98 Brenner, supra note 20, at 32 (citing Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. 
L. REv. 1335, 1351) (internal quotation marks omitted); see SMITH, supra note 52, at 124. 
99 VIKRANT VIJ, WIRELESS COMMUNICATION 1-2 (2010). 
100 DENNIS C. TANNER & MATTHEW E. TANNER, FORENSIC ASPECTS OF SPEECH PATTERNS: VOICE 
PRINTS, SPEAKER PROFILING, LIE AND INTOXICATION DETECTION 60-61 (2004). 
101 See generally WILLIAM 1. HERSCHEL, THE ORIGIN OF FINGER-PRINTING (1916). 
102 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 96, at 85; Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Crimi-
nal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement 
Exemptions, III MICH. L. REV. 485, 508 (2013). In 1934, Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act, which made unauthorized wiretapping a federal crime. Pub. L. No. 416, § 605,48 Stat. 
1064, 1103-04 (1934). Section 605 was amended in 1968 by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. 3, 82 Stat. 197,211-25 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510-20 (2006)), and again in 1986 by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)). Under the 
Wiretap Act, which is part of the ECPA, "courts can authorize continuing surveillance-24 hours a day 
for a 30-day period, which can be extended." DANIEL 1. So LOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL M. 
SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 92 (2006). 
103 Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in 
the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 678-79 (1988) (footnotes 
omitted) (describing a positive relationship between technological advances in surveillance and intru-
sion on privacy). 
104 Id. at 678 n.162. 
105 See Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 242-43 & n.4 (1986). 
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gies during the twentieth century-especially the rise of the computer-
[that] made privacy erupt into a frontline issue around the world.",06 
In addition to using surveillance technologies, the government has 
long obtained personal information about individual citizens by requiring 
its disclosure as an obligation of citizenship. Although the modem census 
gathers information about race, income, and age, the first Congress rejected 
proposals from James Madison to require such disclosures, instead using 
binary categorizations such as woman or man, slave or free man, and adult 
or child.,07 The Department of State began issuing passports to American 
citizens traveling abroad in 1789.108 Passports were mandated for interna-
tional travel during the Civil War and World War 1109 and have been, as a 
general rule, since 1952."0 In 1835, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
"[i]t is understood, as matter of practice, that some evidence of citizenship 
is required, by the secretary of state, before issuing a passport."'" 
Congress instituted the first income tax in 1861 as a means of raising 
revenue for the Civil War. 112 The law imposed a 5-percent tax on the "annu-
al gains, profits, or income of every person residing in the United States" 
for incomes exceeding six hundred dollars.1I3 With the passage of the Six-
teenth Amendment in 1913, the federal government gained the power to 
require the filing of personal financial information, such as gross income, 
on tax retums."4 The first social security number was issued through the 
U.S. Postal Service in 1936,"5 and since then social security numbers have 
come to function as unique personal identifiers 116 that are routinely linked to 
property ownership, residence histories, medical records, and other public 
transactions. 
The government's power to require disclosures of individual data ex-
panded with the rise of the administrative state in the early twentieth centu-
106 SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 4. 
107 Carrie Pixler, Note, Setting the Boundaries of the Census Clause: Normative and Legal Con-
cerns Regarding the American Community Survey, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1097, I I 14 & n.I 18 
(2010). 
108 See Passport Applications, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/researchipassport/ 
index.html (last visited Nov. 24,2013) (citing Act of Aug. 18, 1856, II Stat. 52,60). 
109 See id. (citing Act of May 22,1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154,40 Stat. 559; Act of June 20, 1941, 
Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252). 
110 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 121 (1958) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1185). 
III Urtetiqui v. D' Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835). 
112 LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 
31 (1951). 
113 Revenue Act of 1862,12 Stat. 432, 473. 
114 U.S. CaNST. amend. XVI; see I.R.C. § 6103(d)(I) (2006) (allowing disclosure to enforce tax 
laws); id. § 6103(h)(4)(D), (i) (authorizing disclosure by court order). 
liS The First Social Security Number and the Lowest Number, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.govlhistory/ssnlfirstcard.html(last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
116 Brenner, supra note 20, at 54 n.247. 
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ry.1I7 In addition to social security information, federal agencies now main-
tain thousands of databases with records pertaining to immigration, bank-
ruptcy, military history, and the receipt of federal benefits. Federallegisla-
tion governing housing assistance now enables any law enforcement officer 
to obtain the address, social security number, and photo of assistance recip-
ients without formal legal process. \18 In addition, states possess "records of 
births, marriages, divorces, professional licenses, voting information, work-
er's compensation, personnel files (for public employees), [and] property 
ownership," as well as information about crimes, victims, and arrests. 119 
Some require the collection of biometric information and random drug tests 
as preconditions to receiving public benefits. 120 
The government's legal authority to collect identifying data on indi-
viduals derives from a number of sources. 121 Federal agencies collect a sub-
stantial amount of information pursuant to legislation authorizing complex 
systems of taxation, regulation, licensing, and entitlement distribution. For 
law enforcement, the constitutional gold standard is probable cause and a 
warrant. The government may alternatively use judicial, grand jury, and 
administrative subpoenas and court orders, often upon a showing of mere 
relevance. 122 Modem governmental data collection increasingly involves the 
ability to obtain substantial amounts of information about private citizens 
without any formal process. 123 Administrative and law enforcement agen-
cies can simply purchase personal data from private sector companies 124 or 
mine what already exists in the public domain. 125 Since the private sector 
has turned personal data collection into a multibillion-dollar industry,126 the 
117 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 96, at 243-44. 
118 42 U.S.C. § 1437z (2006); Murphy, supra note 102, at 509. 
119 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 
MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1139 (2002). 
120 Murphy, supra note 102, at 510. 
121 This Article does not distinguish between state and local police departments, national law 
enforcement agencies, and federal agencies engaged in national security functions, the last of which 
raise a host of different legal and policy issues that are beyond the scope of this piece. 
122 Murphy, supra note 102, at 517-18 (citing various legislative provisions for court-ordered 
disclosure of otherwise private information). 
123 See generally David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. 
REV. 62 (2013) (explaining that the gathering of computerized employment, customer, and medical 
records by private and public entities began in the 1960s and led to nearly fifty congressional hearings 
on data privacy issues); see also infra notes 398-401 and accompanying text (discussing Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977), in which the Court recognized a constitutional interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal information). 
124 Murphy, supra note 102, at 511. 
125 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, III MICH. L. REV. 311, 325 
(2012); see generally Murphy, supra note 102, at 519-20 (discussing federal statutes governing the use 
of information collected by law enforcement). 
126 Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, MCKINSEY 
GLOBAL INST., http://www.mckinsey.comlinsightslmgi/researchltechnology _and _innovationlbig_ data_ 
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vitality of this last method is becoming a hallmark of twenty-first century 
government surveillance. 
Private parties have historically lacked equivalent access to others' 
personal information absent the use of private investigators, civil lawsuits, 
consent, trespass, or theft. This is in part a consequence of the enumerated 
constitutional and statutory powers of the federal government,127 as well as 
the states' residuary "police powers," which the Supreme Court has charac-
terized as "the time-tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon 
private interests [ for] 'the interests of the public.'''128 Police powers include 
the authority to perform searches of persons or property, to interrogate 
those in custody, and to subpoena witnesses and documents in both the 
criminal and civil contexts. 129 Although civil discovery is broad, "this power 
does not begin to compare with the power of compulsion under grand jury 
subpoena or the intrusion incident to a physical search for documents."l30 
With the inventions of the computer and the Internet, however, the 
private sector's capacity for gathering massive amounts of personal data for 
commercial purposes has exploded. Individual private corporations in the 
United States have more stored data than the Library of Congress. l31 If the 
total information that exists globally today were transferred to CD-ROMs, 
"they would stretch to the moon in five separate piles."132 The sheer glut of 
data has changed "the essence" of information itself.133 "In a big-data world, 
... we won't have to be fixated on causality; instead we can discover pat-
the _ next_frontier Jor _innovation (last visited Nov. 20, 20 I 3) ("[U]sers of services enabled by personal-
location data could capture $600 billion in consumer surplus."). 
127 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cI. I; id. § 3. The ability ofthe President to provide for national securi-
ty, for example, is a power derived from the enumerated powers of Article II, and it often allows the 
Executive branch greater access to the personal infonnation of private citizens. See generally HAROLD 
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 67-72 (1990) (noting that the Constitution creates three branches of government and vests them 
with powers that affect foreign affairs and national security, but that because "[m]ost often, the text 
simply says nothing about who controls certain domains ... [such as] the conduct of covert action," one 
must look to constitutional structure, statutes, and custom to understand the source of such powers). 
128 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 
U.S. 133, 137 (1894)); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 59S, 618-19 (2000) (observing that 
the Constitution created a federal government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police 
power to the states). For a discussion of the origins and meaning of the tenn, see Santiago Legarre, The 
Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2007). 
129 Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 
101 YALEL.1.1795, ISIO-II (1992). 
130 Id. at 1811 n.56. 
131 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at S; see JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., 
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 19 (2011), available at http://www.mckinsey.comlinsightslbusiness_technologylbig_ 
data_the_nextJrontierJor_innovation (click "Full Report" hyperlink). 
132 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at 9. 
133 See id. at 9-10. 
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terns and correlations in the data that offer us novel and invaluable in-
sights. "134 By applying a mathematical algorithm to hundreds of billions of 
searches, for example, Google can identify a disease outbreak with stunning 
accuracy.\35 Online retailers such as Amazon.com routinely make real-time 
merchandise suggestions from browsing and purchase data.136 Information 
on social networking sites enables companies to identify when, how, and by 
whom their products are being discussed. 137 Web bug trackers allow 
"[a]nalytics and ad serving companies [to] track user behavior across large 
portions of the web."138 
The government now mines huge amounts of personal data from 
online private sector companies without first obtaining a search warrant, 
subpoena, court order, or consent.139 Although police investigations have 
always involved information collection, the amount and variety of data in-
volved today-and the technological ability to create new information by 
cross-referencing data points with other data points-is new.140 By drawing 
134 Id. at 14. 
135 [d. at II. 
136 Douglas Page, Crime Fighting's Next Big Deal, OFFICER. COM (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.officer.com/articlelI0773317 Icrime-fightings-next -big-deal. 
137 J. D. Heyes, NSA Social Spy Network Facebook to Use Facial Recognition Technology to Track 
Individuals Across Photos, Videos, PRISON PLANET (June 24, 2012, 5:52 AM), 
http://www.prisonplanet.comlnsa-social-spy-network-facebook-to-use-facial-recognition-technology-to-
track-individuals-across-photos-videos.html. 
138 KNow PRIVACY, http://www.knowprivacy.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
139 See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (using peer-to-peer software); 
United States v. Courtney, No. 4:07CR261 JLH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109344, at *5-6 (E.D. Ark. 
Sept. 22, 2008) (employing chat rooms, Internet searches, and social networking sites); United States v. 
Carter, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259-60 (D. Nev. 2008) (posting to a "hard core child pornography mes-
sage board" links to a dummy website to record the IP addresses of users); see also United States v. 
Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2009) (pinpointing location using ISP address only); see generally 
DANIEL J. So LOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOWGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 169, 
175 (2004) ("[W]e are increasingly seeing collusion, partly voluntary, partly coerced, between the 
private sector and the government."); Brandon T. Crowther, Comment, (Un)Reasonable Expectation of 
Digital Privacy, 2012 BYU L. REV. 343, 359-60. But see Martin Kaste, Google Explains How It Han-
dles Police Requests for Users' Data, NPR (Jan. 28, 2013, 3:34 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
20 13/0 II28/170428992/google-posts-how-it-handles-requests-for-users-data (reporting that Google 
recently posted a policy of requiring a warrant before law enforcement can access certain categories of 
material, possibly intended to "make it easier for the company to resist pressure from a government 
agency looking for quiet cooperation," as legal requirements for accessing online content are unclear). 
140 Page, supra note 136; see also Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth 
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 39, 45 (2011) ("[W]hole categories of data 
are stored that never were before. If I wanted to purchase a book in a time not so distant, I would enter a 
bookstore, browse in a practically anonymous fashion, and make my purchase with cash. The bookstore 
made no record of my identity other than the fleeting and casual memory of the store clerk. But today if 
I want to purchase a book I am likely to do so online, where not only the bookstore, but also my Internet 
service provider and payment provider will make personal records. Indeed, the bookstore might not only 
record what books I ultimately purchase, but every book I peruse. And these records are stored in a 
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correlations among bits of information stored in various forms-including 
photographs taken from closed-circuit surveillance cameras, algorithms of 
facial images, phone call records, financial transactions, crime statistics, or 
email records-the government will soon be able to predict behavior before 
it happens,141 much like Tom Cruise in the futuristic blockbuster Minority 
Report. 142 
C. FRT: State-of-the-Art Menace? 
FRT produces uniquely powerful data for making correlations across 
exabytes of digital information. Humans engage in facial recognition in-
stinctively by observing and identifying a person as being one they have 
seen before. 143 In addition to facial features, humans use clothing, gait, hair, 
posture, and other information about a subject's physical appearance for 
identification. l44 In automated systems, a device collects information about 
individuals and stores it in a database according to a numeric code or algo-
rithm that represents the face-a "faceprint."'45 This can be done in a num-
ber of ways. One is to measure the distance between various "nodal points" 
or peaks and valleys on the face, such as the eyes, the width of nose, or the 
depth of the eye sockets, cheekbones, jawline, and chin. 146 The faceprint can 
also be generated by mapping the unique placement of pores, lines, and 
spots on the texture of an individual's skin.'47 The computer then searches 
the biometric database for comparisons of the newly acquired facial data to 
digital fonnat that pennits, once an architecture has been established, essentially costless searching and 
distribution."). 
141 Page, supra note 136; see generally The Science of Civil War: What Makes Heroic Strife, 
ECONOMIST (April 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/nodeI21553006 (describing the development 
of computer models to predict the outbreak and spread of civil conflict). 
142 See generally Roger Ebert, Review, Minority Report, ROGEREBERT.COM (June 21, 2012), 
www.rogerebert.comlreviews/minority-report-2002. Person of Interest is a modem series that is similar-
ly premised on the ability of computers to predict crimes from data captured through omnipresent sur-
veillance systems. Mary McNamara, TV Review: 'Person of Interest,' L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2011), 
artic1es.latimes.comlprintl20 II IsepI22/entertainmentlla-et-person-interest-20 II 0922. 
143 See Joyce W. Luk, Note, IdentifYing Terrorists: Privacy Rights in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 223, 230 (2002). 
144 Antitza Dantcheva et aI., Bag of Soft Biometrics for Person Identification: New Trends and 
Challenges 6-7 (Jan. 8, 2010) (manuscript), available at http://www.eurecom.fr/en/publication/ 
3247/downloadlmm-publi·3247 _I.pdf. 
145 Luk, supra note 143, at 230. 
146 See Susan McCoy, Comment, O'Big Brother Where Art Thou? The Constitutional Use of 
Facial-Recognition Technology, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 471,477 (2002). 
147 See id. 
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stored data. 148 FRT is capable of matching a face from a database of over 
1.6 million photos with 92-percent accuracy. 149 
FRT is useful for two main purposes. The first is verification or au-
thentication-that is, the "one-to-one" matching of a faceprint with an indi-
vidual record to authenticate the person's identity. The system does not 
check every record in the database for a match-only that which corre-
sponds to the identity the individual is claiming as his own. ISO FRT can thus 
be used to efficiently control access to secure facilities because it allows 
users to scan, verify, and store a face within a second and requires no phys-
ical touch, password, or employee badge. lSI The second use of FRT is for 
identification of an otherwise unknown individual from an anonymous im-
age. For this function, the FRT system is provided an image and attempts to 
identify a different image of the same individual in the database through a 
"one-to-many" matching process. IS2 Thousands of gigabytes of data are 
searched to retrieve all images that include a particular human subject. Typ-
ically, the computer produces a group of facial images ranked by computer-
evaluated similarity. If a score is above a predetermined threshold, a match 
is identified. ls3 In this way, FRT can be used to identify a particular indi-
vidual or to create a profile of a random subject which could be useful for 
marketing and law enforcement purposes. 
The private sector is rapidly realizing the commercial potential of 
FRT. Retailers use FRT to identify shoplifters. ls4 Casinos use it to detect 
card counters and prevent their entry to the blackjack tables. ISS Airports, 
banks, museums, and factories have installed "walk through identification 
systems" that can identify sixty people per minute lS6 and will eventually 
148 See generally Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: 
Filling the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1393 
(2004). 
149 "Minority Report" Facial Recognition System Being Installed Across USA by FBI; Everyone to 
Be Tracked, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://au.ibtimes.comlarticles/384897/ 
20120917 Iminority-report-facial-recognition-system-being-installed.htm#.U FcJ Lq6Sm 70. 
150 Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Facial Recognition Technology: A Survey of Policy and 
Implementation Issues, CTR. FOR CATASTROPHE PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, II (2009). 
151 See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and 
Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 295,325-26 (1999). 
152 Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 150, at 12. 
153 See id. 
154 Laura J. Nelson, Instant Facial Recognition Tech a Two-Edged Sword, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
20 12), http://articles.latimes.coml2012/nov/14lbusiness/la-fi-face-first-20 121114. 
155 See, e.g., Visual Casino Suite 6, B10METRICA, http://www.biometrica.comlproducts.html(last 
visited Nov. 20, 2013) (corporate website touting FRT product "Virtual Casino 6" for this purpose); 
Ellen Nakashima, From Casinos to Counterterrorism, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticleI2007 110/211 AR20071 021 0 I 522.html. 
156 Press Release, Artec Grp., Artec ID Unveils Next Generation of Biometric 3D Facial Recogni-
tion Technology for High-Traffic Walk Through Identification Systems at ASIS International (Sept. 10, 
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operate at long distances. '57 Technology is being developed to automatically 
adapt videos into "avatar-sized images of just a user's face"'58 and to gauge 
the attractiveness of crowds. '59 In the near future, FRT will be embedded 
into signs and billboards to instantly scan faces, identify recent purchase 
history, and adjust the retailer's message to a person's tastes. l60 Restaurants 
and stores are already exploring uses of FR T to assimilate data from social 
media sites such as Facebook for this purpose.1 61 Using only Facebook and 
commercially available FRT, researchers in 2012 were able to identify col-
lege students more than 30 percent of the time,'62 retrieving their names, 
photos, and other personal information from Facebook-including the first 
five digits of social security numbers-with the privacy settings turned 
on. 163 
Law enforcement now uses FRT systems "to identify suspects, ac-
complices and even innocent bystanders in a wide range of criminal inves-
tigations," with scant public notice. '64 The technology is highly efficient, 
allowing investigators to perform in a manner of minutes a review of sur-
veillance video which might take hundreds of hours to manually com-
2012), available at http://www.marketwire.com/press-releaselartec-id-unveils-next-generation-biometric 
-3d-facial-recognition-technology-high-traffic-1699489 .htm. 
157 Jim Spencer, Facial Recognition: They Know Who You Are, STAR TRIBUNE (last updated Aug. 
17,2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.startribune.comlbusinessIl66593666.html?refer=y (quoting a marketing 
director). 
158 Sarah Perez, Following Facebook 's Shut Down of Face. com 's Facial Recognition API, Lambda 
Labs Debuts an Open Source Alternative, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Sept. 4, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/ 
2012/09/041 followi ng- face books-shut -down -of- face-coms- facial-recogn i ti on-api -lam bda -Iabs-debuts-
an-open-source-altemativel. 
159 See SceneTap: The Creepy App that Scans Bar-Goers' Faces, THE WEEK (May 23, 2012), 
http://theweek .com/ article/indexl22828 I/scenetap-the-creepy-app-that -scans-bar -goers-faces. 
160 Sarah Freishtat, Just a Face in a Crowd? Scans Pick up ID, Personal Data, WASH. TIMES (July 
26, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/20 12/juI/26/just-a-face-in-a-crowd-scans-pick-up-id-
personal-d/?page=all. 
161 See Somini Sengupta & Kevin J. O'Brien, Facebook Can ID Faces, but Using Them Grows 
Tricky, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/technology/facebook-backs-
down-on-face-recognition-in-europe.html?_r=O (noting that the developer Redpepper has stated that 
"users would have to authorize the application to pull their most recent tagged photographs"); White-
head, supra note 3 ("[A] new Facebook application, Facedeals, is being tested ... which enables busi-
nesses to target potential customers with specialized offers."). 
162 Alessandro Acquisti, Ralph Gross & Fred Stutzman, Presentation, Faces of Facebook: Privacy 
in the Age of Augmented Reality (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.blackhat.com/docsl 
webcastlacquisti-face-BH -Webinar-20 12-out.pdf. 
163 Bob Sullivan, Researchers Say They Can Guess Your SSN, NBCNEWS.COM (July 6, 2009, 7:59 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/techno logy/researchers-say-they-can -guess-your -ssn-6C I 0406565. 
164 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, State Photo-ID Databases Become Troves for Police, 
WASH. POST (June 16, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 13-06-16/business/400 12903_ 
1_ databases- facial-recognition-systems-searches. 
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plete. 165 Thirty-seven states now apply FRT to searchable databases contain-
ing the images of more than 120 million people from driver's license regis-
tries and non-driver identification cards. 166 Ten states have authorized FBI 
access to their data for investigative purposes.167 All combined, federal and 
state FRT databases currently contain approximately 400 million facial 
images. 168 The most advanced systems enable officers to run searches of 
this data from laptops in squad cars.169 
In addition to photos obtained from passports, drivers' licenses, and 
mug shots, the government is collecting countless video and still images of 
the general public from surveillance cameras in public locations and other 
sources. A company named Trapwire is working with police from the Dis-
trict of Columbia, New York, and Los Angeles on rapid analysis of live 
footage from closed-circuit TV surveillance cameras,170 which number in 
the thousands in the New York City subway system alone. 171 Undercover 
police in Florida have reportedly "mingl[ ed] with the public, using their 
smartphones to take videos and photos," and then checked images against 
FRT data to pull up names and identities.172 At the 2012 Republican Na-
tional Convention in Tampa, live videos from smartphones fed into a sur-
veillance system that included ninety-four high-definition cameras. 173 The 
Federal Communications Commission gave permission to test this surveil-
lance system as "part of an effort to eventually develop a similar $7 billion 
National Public Safety Broadband Network [of] highly secure, encrypted 
voice, video, and data communications, as well as an evidence-quality, 
165 Mariel Myers, Boston Bombings: How Facial Recognition Can Cut Investigation Time to 
Seconds, CNET.COM (April IS, 2013, 5:56 PM), http://news.cnet.comlS301-1009_3-575S0367-
S3Iboston-bombings-how-facial-recognition-can-cut-investigation-time-to-seconds/. 
166 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 164. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 [d. The software of a single private contractor, MorphoTrust USA, operates in most government 
FRT systems. Id. 
170 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
171 lesus Diaz, FBI's Sinister New $1 Billion Project Will Track Everyone by Their Face, 
GIZMODO (Sept. 10, 2012, I :44 PM), http://gizmodo.coml5941926/fbis-sinister-new-I-billion-project-
will-track-everyone-by-their-face. In August 2012, the New York Police Department ("NYPD") part-
nered with Microsoft to launch what it calls a "Domain Awareness System," which analyzes data col-
lected from 3,000 closed-circuit video cameras, records of 911 calls, license plate readers, historical 
crime reports, and radiation sensors throughout the city. The NYPD can now instantly track where a 
particular vehicle has been in recent days or weeks, pull up the driver's arrest records and related 911 
calls, and map his criminal history "to geospacially and chronologically reveal crime patterns." Page, 
supra note 136. 
172 Darlene Storm, Undercover Cops Secretly Use Smart phones, Face Recognition to Spy on 
Crowds, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. IS, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://blogs.computerworld.comlprivacy/ 
2101 O/undercover-cops-secretly-use-smartphones-face-recognition-spy-crowds. 
173 Id. Older video cameras did not have the resolution or connectivity to work with FRT. Diaz, 
supra note 171. 
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permanent recording of all data collected."174 The government's access to 
real-time data will soar as upwards of thirty thousand surveillance drones 
are launched in the next decade,175 many by private sector corporations. 
Equipped with powerful FRT cameras, the drones "will be capable of cap-
turing minute details, including every mundane action performed by every 
person in an entire city simultaneously."176 
At the federal level, the FBI has undertaken a billion-dollar effort to 
expand its current fingerprint database into a Next Generation Identification 
("NGI") system that will include data such as iris scans, photos, palm 
prints, gait and voice recordings, scars, tattoos, and DNA. 177 "NGI will use 
a variety of biometric data, cross-referenced against the nation's growing 
network of surveillance cameras to not only track your every move but cre-
ate a permanent 'recognition' file on you within the government's massive 
databases."17s The plan is for NGI to be "fully operational in 2014," and to 
share its information with other federal agencies and the states. 179 
Additionally, government FRT systems have access to private sector 
sources of images-including private cell phones and social networking 
websites-for use in identifying subjects. ISO Facebook's "tag suggestion" 
function automatically retrieves the names of individuals in photos upload-
ed by its one billion users at a rate of three hundred million a day. lSI Alt-
hough Facebook made a statement to Congress that it "store[s FRT] tem-
plates in encrypted form and maintain[s] them in a monitored and access-
174 Stonn, supra note 172 (quoting Josh Smith, Undercnver Police Used Smartphones to Keep 
Tabs on Protests in Tampa, NAT'L J. (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.comltech/ 
smartphones-used-to-rnonitor-tarnpa-protests-20 120917) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
176 Id. 
177 Id.; see David Jeffers, FBI Rolling Out High-Tech 'Big Brother' Monitoring System, PC 
WORLD (Sept. 10,2012,6:58 AM), http://www.pcworld.comlarticle/26207I1fbiJoIling_out_hightech_ 
big_brother_monitoring_system.html. In 2002, it was reported that the Department of Defense was 
similarly developing a Total Infonnation Awareness project that would consist of a huge database of 
personal financial, educational, health, and travel infonnation about individuals, obtained from private 
sector companies. In response to a public outcry, Congress voted to deny funding for the initiative. 
Shannon R. Anderson, Total Information Awareness and Beyond: The Dangers of Data Mining Tech-
nology to Prevent Terrorism, BILL OF RTS. DEF. COMM., 3 (July 26, 2004), http://www.bordc.orgldata-
mining.pdf. 
178 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
179 Id. 
180 The FBI claims not to be mining such data at this time. See Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Data Mining 
Reached Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.coml2007/09/09/ 
washington/09fbi.html?pagewanted=all. With an FRT search from his smartphone, a detective in Car-
lisle, Pa., recently identified a suspect by linking a Facebook image with a mug shot database. Timberg 
& Nakashima, supra note 166. 
181 Sengupta & 0' Brien, supra note 161. 
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restricted database,"182 its current privacy policy reserves a right to "access, 
preserve and share information when we have a good faith belief it is nec-
essary to: detect, prevent and address ... illegal activity" or "to protect our-
selves, you and others."183 It was recently disclosed that the National Secu-
rity Agency's ("NSA") Prism program enables direct government access to 
the systems of Google, Apple, Facebook, and other Internet companies for 
purposes of obtaining search histories, email content, file transfers, and live 
chats. 184 Government agencies also collaborate with private entities through 
a network of federally funded "fusion centers" for mining collective data-
bases and histories of online activity.18s 
The law enforcement and national security benefits of using FRT in 
targeted criminal investigations are self-evident. 186 But its potential for ena-
bling surveillance of common citizens is troubling. Before FRT, drivers' 
license photos were of limited utility to investigators unless a subject's 
name was already known. 187 Law enforcement can now capture a facial 
image of an unknown individual without the subject's knowledge, match 
the image with other bits of data using FRT algorithms, and come up with a 
rich dossier of personal information. 188 Although fingerprint data similarly 
enables investigators to attach a name to unidentified biometric data,189 FRT 
182 Hearing on "What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties," 
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. and the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 112th Congo I (2012) 
(questions for the record from Sen. AI Franken for Rob Shennan), available at 
http://www .j udiciary .senate. gov Iresources/transcripts/up loadl071812Q FRs-Shennan. pdf. 
183 Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https:llwww.facebook.comlaboutlprivacy/other (last visited Nov. 
20,20\3). 
184 Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, 
Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldl20\3/jun/06/us-tech-
giants-nsa-data. Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, authorizes intelligence-
gathering on non-U.S. citizens for up to a year and has been cited by Director of National Intelligence 
James Clapper as the legal authority for the Prism program. Sam Stein, PRISM Program: Obama Ad-
ministration Held 22 Briefings for Congress on Key FISA Law, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 20 \3, 4:0 I 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2013/06/10/prism-program-obama_n_3416973.html. 
185 Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to 
Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262,264 (20\3). 
186 See Press Release, Iowa State Univ., Iowa State Professor Weighs Benefit vs. Risk of Facial 
Recognition Technology (May 8, 2013), available at http://www.news.iastate.eduinews/20\3/0S/08/ 
facialrecognition. 
187 See Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 166 ("The increasingly widespread deployment of the 
technology in the United States has helped police find murderers, bank robbers and drug dealers, many 
of whom leave behind images on surveillance videos or social-media sites that can be compared against 
official photo databases. "). 
188 Id. At this point, "[a]n affidavit for a warrant could then be automatically generated, electroni-
cally signed and forwarded to a judge. Once granted, investigators could use a code to enter an encrypt-
ed portal to the telephone service provider and get GPS coordinates that lead right to the suspect." Page, 
supra note \36. 
189 See Maryland V. King, \33 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Fingerprints of 
arrestees are taken primarily to identifY them (though that process sometimes solves crimes) .... "). 
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goes much further. Once a person is identified, rapid correlations with 
countless other images and data points in cyberspace and self-contained 
databases can detect past activity and predict future movements. 190 Taken to 
its extreme, this technology could be used to perform "identity sweeps" of 
random subjects for relatively benign activities like walking a dog without a 
leash. '91 A few states have imposed legislative barriers to police collection 
of and access to FRT data, but many others have not. 192 The feasibility of 
domestic "police state" surveillance operations is thus no longer a matter of 
science fiction. '93 FRT renders innocent people susceptible to intrusive po-
lice investigations for being "tagged" in a photo with someone suspected of 
a crime. 194 
Although the FBI currently limits the use of FRT to finding potential 
leads,'95 there remains significant potential for errors and abuse. '96 Match 
errors occur in the form of false positives and false negatives. A false posi-
tive occurs where the FRT system incorrectly declares a successful match 
when the images are not of the same individual. '97 A false negative occurs 
where the FRT system fails to declare a match when the images are, in fact, 
of the same individual. '98 Image quality, the background environment, the 
movement and age of the subject, the focus and quality of the camera, light-
ing, and the angle at which the subject's image is captured all contribute to 
match errors. 199 If a face or set of features is altered with a disguise or hat, 
the likelihood of misidentification increases.2oo Yet law enforcement offic-
ers rely on electronic matches of photographs and images in the FBI's exist-
ing database without any human verification of the results.20' And as a re-
190 See generally id (discussing the distinction betwt:en fingerprinting and DNA analysis for 
purposes of solving crimes versus verifying identities). 
191 Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 166. 
192 Id. 
193 Id 
194 Id In the European Union, Facebook turned off its FRT after regulators deemed it a threat to 
privacy. Chris Smith, Facebook Turns Off Facial Recognition Tech in EU, TECHRADAR.COM (Sept. 22, 
2012), http://www.techradar.comlus/newslinternetlweb/ facebook -tums-off-facial-recogni ti on-tech-i n-
eu-1099104; see also Sengupta & O'Brien, supra note 161 (noting that Facebook also agreed to "delete 
the data used to identify Facebook users by their pictures"); Blue, supra note 47 (discussing actions by 
other EU countries). A Washington, D.C., advocacy group has filed a complaint against Facebook with 
the Federal Trade Commission over its tagging feature. Sengupta & O'Brien, supra note 161. 
195 Spencer, supra note 157. 
196 Whitehead, supra note 3. 
197 JOHN VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 376 (2007). 
198 Id 
199 Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 150, at 3, 18,38-39. 
200 Richa Singh, Mayank Vatsa & Afzel Noore, Recognizing Face Images with Disguise Variations 
149, 151, 156 (June I, 2008) (manuscript), available at http://cdn.intechopen.comlpdfs/5898/1nTech-
Recognizing_face _images _ with_disguise _ variations. pdf. 
201 Madison Ruppert, FBI Sharing Facial Recognition Software with Police Departments Across 
America, END THE LIE (Aug. 24, 2012), http://endthelie.com/2012/08124/fbi-sharing-facial-recognition-
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suIt of what is known as "function creep" or "mission creep," the initial 
purpose for lawfully collecting images may later morph into additional uses 
that were unannounced or unintended.202 These vulnerabilities have serious 
implications, even for those with no reason to fear law enforcement. 
D. The Harms o/Compromised Anonymity 
In the big data universe, FRT enables users to trace a passerby's life in 
real time-past, present, and future-through the relation of faceprint algo-
rithms with other data points. Although the American public's reaction to 
the NSA's Prism program was relatively muted,203 most people understand 
the awkward feeling of being stared at on a bus.2D4 Constant surveillance by 
the government is more pernicious. It discovers a person's identity and then 
augments that information based on intelligence that today's technology 
renders limitless. The loss of anonymity that results from the detailed con-
struction of a person's identity through ongoing monitoring can lead to at 
least three categories of harm, discussed below. 
First, as the panopticon suggests, ongoing identification and tracking 
can adversely influence behavior. People involuntarily experience "self-
software-with-police-departments-across-america/#axzz2fwTGPWgr. The FBI has indicated that only 
authorized law enforcement agencies have access to its data, which does not currently include photos 
from social media sites. Critics claim, however, that the FBI does intend to search social media sites 
with FRT technology. Kathleen Hickey, FBI to Open Facial Recognition Searches to Police Nation-
wide, GCN.COM (Aug. 20, 2012), http://gcn.comJarticles/2012/08/20/lbi-facial-recognition-software-
open-to-police.aspx. 
202 The sole purpose of the creation of social security numbers, for example, was to facilitate 
record keeping and determine the amount of social security taxes to credit to each contributor's account. 
By 1961, however, the IRS began using social security numbers for tax identification purposes. See 
Bijon Roy, A Case Against Biometric National Identification Systems (NIDS): "Trading-Off" Privacy 
Without Gelling Security, 19 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 45, 75-76 (2005); see also Tom 
Cheshire,25 Big Ideas for 2012: Ubiquitous Face Recognition, WIRED (Jan. 9, 2012, 9:22 
AM), http://www.wired.com/businessl2012/01/ubiquitous-face-recognition (noting that there are con-
cerns over FRT mission creep and quoting a security technology expert as saying that "[rJecognizing 
people in photographs works well ... [b Jut attempts to pick terrorists out of crowds have failed, result-
ing in systems that do a great job surveilling innocents and a terrible job identif'ying the guilty" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
203 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, PUBLIC SAYS INVESTIGATE TERRORISM, EVEN IF IT INTRUDES ON 
PRIVACY: MAJORITY VIEWS NSA PHONE TRACKING AS ACCEPTABLE ANTI-TERROR TACTIC I (2013), 
available at http://www.people-press.orgifilesilegacy-pdf/06-1 0-13%20PRC%20WP%20Surveiliance% 
20Release.pdf (reporting that, as of June 2013, 56 percent of Americans believe that Prism is an ac-
ceptable way for the government to investigate terrorism). 
204 Many cities have begun equipping buses with security cameras. William Neuman, Equipment 
Problems Delay Plan for Cameras on Buses, N.Y. TIMES (March 29,2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/03/29/nyregionl29bus.html? _r=0. 
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censorship and inhibition" in response to the feeling of being watched.20s 
They "might think twice," for example, "before visiting websites of ex-
treme sports or watching sitcoms glorifying couch potatoes if they felt this 
might result in higher insurance premiums."206 The social norms that devel-
op around expectations of surveillance can, in tum, become a tool for con-
trolling others. To be sure, social control is beneficial for the deterrence of 
crime and management of other negative behavior. Too much social con-
trol, however, "can adversely impact freedom, creativity, and self-
development."207 Professor Jeffrey Rosen has explained that the pressures of 
having one's private scandals "outed" can push people toward socially in-
fluenced courses of action that, without public disclosure and discussion, 
would never happen.2oR They are less willing to voice controversial ideas or 
associate with fringe groups for fear of bias or reprisal. 209 With the sharing 
of images online, the public contributes to what commentators have called 
"sousveillance" or a "reverse Panoptic on" effect, whereby "the watched 
become the watchers."210 
Second, dragnet-style monitoring can cause emotional harm. Living 
with constant monitoring is stressful, inhibiting the subject's ability to relax 
and negatively affecting social relationships.211 When disclosures involve 
particularly sensitive physical or emotional characteristics that are normally 
concealed-such as "[g]rief, suffering, trauma, injury, nudity, sex, urina-
tion, and defecation"-a person's dignity and self-esteem is affected, and 
incivility toward that person increases.212 
Third, constant surveillance through modem technologies reduces ac-
countability for those who use the data to make decisions that affect the 
people they are monitoring.213 The collection of images for FRT applica-
205 ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 17 (2011) (quoting Daniel J. 
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphorsfor Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393,1418 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1897, a study found that the presence of 
other riders caused cyclists to pedal faster. Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Pre-
sent Constitutionality of Big Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST 
AMENDMENT L. REV. 234, 271 & n.136 (2007) (citing Norman Triplett, The Dynamogenic Factors in 
Pacemaking and Competition, 9 AM. 1. PSYCHOL. 507, 533 (1898)); see also Siobogin, supra note 23, at 
242-47,251 (describing empirical research on the effects of being watched). 
206 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at 57. 
207 So love, supra note 17, at 494. 
208 Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. LJ. 2117, 2122 (200 I). 
209 See Siobogin, supra note 23, at 217; infra Part 11.8 (discussing FRT and the First Amendment). 
210 Carla Scherr, Note, You Better Watch Out, You Beller Not Frown, New Video Surveillance 
Techniques Are Already in Town (and Other Public Spaces), 3 US: J.L. & POL'y FOR INFO. SOC'y 499, 
505 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
211 Solove, supra note 17, at 555. 
212 Id. at 536-37. 
213 Id. at 508-09, 523; cf id. at 509 (discussing United States Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), in which the Supreme Court found that 
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tions is indiscriminate, with no basis for suspecting a particular subject of 
wrongdoing. It allows users to cluster disparate bits of infonnation together 
from one or more random, unidentified images such that "[t]he whole be-
comes greater than the parts."214 The individuals whose images are captured 
do not know how their data is being used and have no ability to control the 
manipulation of their faceprints, even though the connections that are made 
reveal new facts that the subjects did not knowingly disclose. The party 
doing the aggregating gains a powerful tool for fonning and disseminating 
personal judgments that render the subject vulnerable to public humiliation 
and other tangible hanns, including criminal investigation.215 Incorrect sur-
veillance infonnation can lead to lost job opportunities, intense scrutiny at 
airports, false arrest, and denials of public benefits. 216 In turn, a lack of 
transparency, accountability, and public participation in and around surveil-
lance activities fosters distrust in government. The recent scandal and frac-
tured diplomatic relations over NSA surveillance of U.S. allies is a case in 
point.217 Perhaps most troubling, FRT enhances users' capacity to identify 
and track individuals' propensity to take particular actions,218 which stands 
in tension with the common law presumption of innocence embodied in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.219 As de-
scribed below, prevailing constitutional doctrine does not account for the 
use of technology to identify, track, and predict the behavior of a subject 
using an anonymous public image and big data correlations. 
II. ANONYMITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Although the Constitution lacks an express right to privacy, the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that the Bill of Rights reflects the Framers' 
concern for protecting specific aspects of physical privacy, such as privacy 
disclosure of FBI rap sheets containing aggregated information-otherwise public-violated a privacy 
exemption of the Freedom of Information Act). 
214 !d. at 507. 
215 Id. at 508-09, 523. 
216 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1274 
(2008). 
217 See Ken Dilanian & Janet Stobart, White House OKd Spying on Allies, u.s. Intelligence Offi-
cials Say, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2013, 7:25 PM), http://www.latimes.comlworldlla-fg-spying-phones-
201 3 I029,0,3235295.story#axzz2jEB9FaoQ. 
218 See The 'Big Data' Revolution: How Number Crunchers Can Predict Our Lives, NPR.ORG 
(Mar. 7, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/20 13/03/07 II 731 76488/the-big-data-revolution-how-
number-crunchers-can-predict-our-lives (reporting that law enforcement is already engaged in predictive 
policing). 
219 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The right to a fair trial is a fundamental 
liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The presumption of innocence, although not articulated 
in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." (citation 
omitted)). 
2014] ANONYM ITY, F ACEPRINTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 437 
of speech and assembly (First Amendment),220 privacy of the home against 
demands that it be used to house soldiers (Third Amendment),22I privacy of 
the person and possessions against unreasonable searches (Fourth Amend-
ment),222 and informational privacy (Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination).223 Many view the splintered decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticuf24 as the Supreme Court's first recognition of a right to deci-
sional privacy225 on the theory that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance," and that some of those guarantees "create 
zones ofprivacy."226 Writing for a majority of which two Justices concurred 
only in the judgment, Justice Douglas construed such penumbras to include 
the First Amendment's right of association and the Fourth Amendment's 
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures."227 Although the Supreme Court has 
steadily reviewed new surveillance technologies under the Fourth Amend-
ment for more than a century, prevailing doctrine leaves FRT beyond con-
stitutional scrutiny. By contrast, anonymity is an interest that has received 
First Amendment protection, but no court has extended that doctrine to 
220 u.s. CONST. amend. I. 
221 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
222 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
223 U.S. CONST. amend. v. Although the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled testimonial 
incrimination, it does not apply to compulsory fingerprinting, photographing, taking measurements, 
writing or speaking for identification purposes, having bodily fluids drawn, or DNA evidence because 
they are not evidence of a communicative or testimonial nature. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757,760-61,764 (1966); Shaffer v. Same, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (10th Cir. 1998). FRT is capable of 
more than simply identifYing a person's face. It can be used to identify an individual as being at a spe-
cific location at a specific time. The Fifth Amendment, however, does not limit the government's collec-
tion of FRT data from private sources, or its subsequent use of FRT for identification and surveillance of 
individuals. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "a party incriminated by evidence produced 
by a third party sustains no violation of his own Fifth Amendment rights." Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 
416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (citing additional cases). Hence, the Fifth Amendment does not protect against 
subpoenas for a person's records and papers held by third parties. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 
328,333-35 (1973). 
224 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
225 See generally Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 
(2006) (book review) ("Decisional privacy is usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain 
kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive autonomy .... "). 
226 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 n.25 (1977) (quoting 
Griswold in Fourth Amendment case); Cal. Bankers, 416 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Finan-
cial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At some point, 
governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy."). In sub-
sequent decisions, the privacy right has come to encompass matters such as child rearing, procreation, 
and termination of medical treatment as a matter of due process. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 
190 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
227 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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government surveillance methods.228 Thus, as things stand, the Constitution 
plays no meaningful role in confining the serious anonymity harms associ-
ated with FRT identification and monitoring. 
A. Anonymity and the Fourth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he overriding function of 
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State.'>229 In Mapp v. Ohio,230 the Court charac-
terized the Fourth Amendment as actually establishing a "right to privacy, 
no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to 
the people."231 Together with the Fifth Amendment,232 the Fourth Amend-
ment "express[es] 'supplementing phases of the same constitutional pur-
pose-to maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy."'233 Application 
of traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine to modem surveillance technolo-
gies such as FRT nonetheless risks emptying such privacy guarantees of 
meamng. 
Numerous scholars have addressed whether the Fourth Amendment 
covers the government's use of novel technologies, and how leading doc-
trine should be adjusted to ensure sufficient constitutional scrutiny of new 
methods of conducting a law enforcement "search."234 This Section high-
lights an additional nuance that warrants consideration within this discus-
sion: a distinction between pre-digital and digital age cases. The surveil-
lance potential of big data was only technologically possible after the Inter-
net took hold on the public with the development of the first webpage and 
web browsers in the early 1990s.235 Today, it is technology's capacity to 
generate new information by making correlations among individual data 
points which poses unprecedented threats to the ability to remain anony-
mous in modem society, rendering traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine 
228 Blitz, supra note 148, at 1381. 
229 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
230 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
231 ld. at 656. 
232 See supra note 223. 
233 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (quoting Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-90 (1944), over-
ruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1964)). 
234 See, e.g., Guttennan, supra note 103, at 651 (arguing that "fourth amendment jurisprudence will 
be best served by adhering to a 'value-dominated model' that is capable of reconciling the competing 
privacy interests with modem technological surveillance"); Kerr, supra note 125, at 311 (analyzing a 
'''mosaic theory' of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of govern-
ment activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search"). 
235 See Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15 WIDENER L.J. 667, 669 
(2006) (characterizing twenty-first century "pervasive technology" as the "antithesis of context-specific 
technologies such as rail transportation" and observing that "the goal and practice of pervasive technol-
ogy is to integrate sophisticated interactive technologies into the fabric of our daily lives"). 
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outmoded for the digital age. As explained below, a contingent of the Su-
preme Court is beginning to recognize that constitutional doctrine must be 
adapted to establish boundaries on the use of technology for constant sur-
veillance of the general public. 
1. Pre-Digital Age 
The categorization of government activity as a search under the Fourth 
Amendment is important under traditional doctrine: if something is not a 
search, the analysis ends, and the government is not required to show prob-
able cause.236 A traditional search is like the tort of trespass, which existed 
at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. It involves a physical in-
trusion on private property. The Supreme Court deviated from this proper-
ty-based approach to determining whether something is a search early on, 
however, and developed a "reasonable expectation of privacy" trigger. 237 In 
the absence of a trespass, "a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recog-
nizes as reasonable."238 The legitimate expectation of privacy in a searched 
person or location must meet both a subjective and an objective test of rea-
sonableness. "[F]irst, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation 
of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing 
to recognize that expectation as reasonable?"239 For subpoenas, the Court 
has invoked the Fourth Amendment only minimally, applying a reasonable-
ness test that is satisfied if a subpoena is not "too sweeping in its terms."240 
It has also authorized warrantless searches in three circumstances: if there is 
"reasonable suspicion" of a past or imminent crime to justify a stop and 
frisk;241 if '''special needs' other than the normal need for law enforcement 
provide sufficient justification" for a search,242 as in cases of mandatory 
drug testing for employment or in schools;243 and if a regulatory scheme 
236 See, e.g., Dow Chern. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (concluding the Fourth 
Amendment analysis when aerial surveillance was found not to be a search). 
237 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
238 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 (2001). 
239 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
240 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), overruled in part on other grounds by Murphy v. 
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52,69 (1964); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE § 4. I 3 (a) (5th ed. 2012) ("Although the Supreme Court has stated in dicta that the Fourth 
Amendment continues to limit the subpoena power of the government, the Court has rejected Fourth 
Amendment objections to subpoenas in every case it has decided in modem times." (footnote omitted». 
241 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968). Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable 
cause; it requires "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." !d. at 22. 
242 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001). 
243 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,633-34 (1989) (employment); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (schools). 
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authorizes warrantless inspections of property "for compliance with health 
and safety standards,»244 for example. Additionally, the Court has estab-
lished a status-based continuum of diminished privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment which includes "parolees hav[ing] fewer expectations 
of privacy than probationers."245 
The question of what "privacy" means under the Fourth Amendment 
has nonetheless been in flux from the phrase's inception.246 In Olmstead v. 
United States,247 Louis Brandeis famously dissented from the majority's 
holding that wiretapping was not a Fourth Amendment violation absent 
physical trespass to the home, employing his familiar theory that "[t]he 
makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the 
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men."248 Employing a property-based approach to the 
Fourth Amendment, Boyd v. United States249 marked a high point of the 
Supreme Court's recognition of broad protections against government inva-
sion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. In refusing to uphold a court 
order directing a defendant in a civil forfeiture proceeding to produce doc-
umentary evidence of liability, the Court framed the "essence" of the gov-
ernment's offense as "the invasion of [the] indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property," as the framers were keenly 
attuned to "[t]he struggles against arbitrary power in which they had been 
engaged for more than 20 years" when they approved the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.25o 
In Katz v. United States/51 however, a majority of the Court rejected 
the property-based reasoning of Boyd and held that the relevant Fourth 
Amendment inquiry is whether the practice at issue "violated the privacy 
upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied."252 It wrote that the Constitu-
244 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,811 n.2 (1996). 
245 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006); see generally Rachae1 A. Lynch, Note, Two 
Wrongs Don't Make a Fourth Amendment Right: Samson Court Errs in Choosing Proper Analytical 
Framework, Errs in Result, Parolees Lose Fourth Amendment Protection, 41 AKRON L. REV. 651,669-
70 (2008) (noting that "parolees have an expectation of privacy somewhere between that ofa probation-
er and a prisoner" (footnote omitted)). 
246 An originalist might interpret the Constitution to argue that no general right to privacy exists 
beyond the specific Bin of Rights guarantees because, among other reasons, no such right is expressed 
in the plain language of the Constitution. See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011). 
247 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
248 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
249 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
250 Id. at 630; see generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 
957, 998 (\ 982) (construing Boyd as treating property as coextensive with personal privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
251 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
252 Id. at 353. 
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tion "protects people, not places."253 Thus, the government violated the 
Fourth Amendment in electronically listening to and recording the defend-
ant's conversation in a public telephone booth--once a fixture on American 
street comers and in Superman comics. The Court found it insignificant that 
the electronic device did not penetrate the structure's walls. 254 In doing so, 
the Court rejected the property-based approach to electronic surveillance, 
instead embracing Brandeis's articulation of the "right to be let alone. "255 It 
has restated this refrain many times since.256 
Despite the doctrinal shift in Katz, existing Fourth Amendment doc-
trine provides no clear protection from government surveillance conducted 
through an amalgamation of FRT algorithms and other data. That Court 
made clear that "[ w ]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."257 Accordingly, the Court has held that, because "[t]he exterior of a 
car ... is thrust into the public eye, ... to examine it does not constitute a 
'search."'258 Nor is there a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone 
numbers "voluntarily conveyed ... to the telephone company and 'ex-
posed' ... in the ordinary course of business."259 There is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in abandoned property, like garbage left out for col-
lection,260 or in the movements of an automobile on public thoroughfares. 261 
As a consequence, the collection of a faceprint does not constitute a 
search under the Court's longstanding view that "mere visual observation 
does not constitute a search."262 Non-consensual facial scanning amounts to 
253 Id. at 351. 
254 Id. at 353. 
255 !d. at 350. 
256 See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The] right of 
privacy ... includes the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for, ' "outside areas of plainly 
harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go 
where he pleases." '" (citation omitted) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958))); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird,405 U.S. 438,453 n.IO (1972) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)); Stan-
ley, 394 U.S. at 564 ("[A]lso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy."); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,413 
(1967) (Fortas, 1., dissenting) ("[The right to privacy] is, simply stated, the right to be let alone; to live 
one's life as one chooses, frce from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the 
clear needs of community living under a government of law."). 
257 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
258 New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,114 (1986). 
259 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
260 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988). 
261 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
262 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012); see generally Douglas A. Fretty, Face-
Recognition Surveillance: A Moment of Truth for Fourth Amendment Rights in Public Places, 16 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 430,441 (2011) (analyzing FRT under Fourth Amendment law and suggesting that 
"[g]overnment agencies have a strong argument ... that where people lack an expectation of not being 
observed, they equally lack an expectation of not being recognized"); Scherr, supra note 210, at 508 
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no more than visual observation of what is held out to the public. To the 
extent that FRT is considered part and parcel of the traditional visual sur-
veillance that police conduct in unmarked vehicles-which has long been 
considered constitutionaP63-the Fourth Amendment does not apply. FRT 
also targets an area of the body that a person would not reasonably expect 
to consider private. The Court has held that the taking of a photograph does 
not constitute a search because "[i]t does not involve a physical intrusion 
onto the person" and does not "invade[] any recognized 'expectation of 
privacy. '''264 Insofar as FRT enables law enforcement to identify a subject 
from an anonymous photo, moreover, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
Courf65 suggests that such identification is constitutionaP66 There, the 
Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to a law requiring people to 
identify themselves during a police stop on the theory that "[a ]nswering a 
request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of 
things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances."267 In dissent, 
Justice Stevens highlighted the ability to attach a name to "a broad array of 
information about the person" which, "in tum, can be tremendously useful 
in a criminal prosecution. "268 
Even if the Fourth Amendment were construed to broaden the mean-
ing of "search" to encompass FRT, it would be an empty victory for privacy 
advocates. Many smartphones contain FRT technology,269 and private citi-
zens snap and upload countless images onto Facebook each day. Aside 
from the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery,270 the Constitution-and 
thus Brandeis's constitutional formulation of a right to be let alone-applies 
only "as against the Government."271 If private parties employ FRT, the 
Constitution is not triggered. Those concerned that government will obtain 
(arguing that video surveillance of actions within plain view is not covered by the Fourth Amendment); 
Alexander T. Nguyen, Comment, Here's Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology 
Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, VA. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2002, at 1,7 (arguing that the 
Fourth Amendment "seems useless" in the context of FRT). 
263 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,213 (1986) (noting that officers can make observations 
from public vantage points). 
264 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1986 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)) (citing Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 
1413-14 (2013)). 
265 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
266 Id. at 191. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
269 By 2017, it is expected that 665 million smartphones and tablets will have FRT. Spencer, supra 
note 157. 
270 U.S. CONST. amend. Xlll. There are also relatively rare exceptions under the state action doc-
trine. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1412 
(2003) (describing state action doctrine). 
271 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled in 
pan by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,353 (1967). 
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existing FRT data through private channels have no apparent constitutional 
remedy if governmental use of such data effectively results in indiscrimi-
nate, twenty-four hour passive surveillance. 
Relatedly, the Supreme Court "has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a 
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities."m There is no 
Fourth Amendment ban on the use of information obtained through gov-
ernment informants, for example,273 even though they "frustrat[ e] actual 
expectations of privacy."274 The Court has also upheld the warrantless in-
stallation of pen registers to record numbers dialed from a subject's home 
on the theory that "telephone subscribers [do not] harbor any general expec-
tation that the numbers they dial will remain secret."275 It has condoned 
government scrutiny of documents provided to accountants,276 banks,277 and 
physicians,m because such documents "contain only information voluntari-
ly conveyed" and the individual "takes the risk ... that the information will 
be conveyed by that person to the Government."279 With the advent of the 
Internet, lower courts have applied the third-party doctrine to justify gov-
ernment subpoenas of shared computer files, information sent or received 
through the Internet and stored on a third-party server/so and individual 
subscriber information obtained from Internet service providers without a 
272 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
752 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963)). 
273 White, 401 U.S. at 748-49; see also Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (no Fourth Amendment protection 
for conversations with a colleague who turns out to be a government agent); Lewis v. United States, 385 
U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (same regarding interactions with secret agent sent by the government to purchase 
narcotics from defendant); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 437 (same regarding agent's use of electronic recording 
equipment). 
274 White, 401 U.S. at 752; see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case/or the Third Party Doctrine, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 561, 566-70 (2009) (discussing cases and arguing in favor of third party doctrine as it 
"ensures technological neutrality of the Fourth Amendment by blocking the opportunistic use of third 
parties to circumvent the basic balance of Fourth Amendment rules" and because it "is needed to pro-
vide ex ante clarity"). Compare Henderson, supra note 140, at 44 (responding to Professor Kerr and 
arguing that the third party doctrine is arbitrary), with Tokson, supra note 38, at 581 (arguing that in-
formation provided only to automated systems does not result in a loss of privacy under the third party 
doctrine). 
275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,741,743 (1979). 
276 Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322,335-36 (1973). 
277 Cal. Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 52 (1974). 
278 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977). 
279 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); see also United States v. Payner, 447 
U.S. 727, 731-32 (1980) (criminal defendant had no standing to suppress documents illegally seized 
from a bank officer's briefcase because he had no privacy interest in them). 
280 Junichi P. Semitsu, From Facebook to Mug Shot: How the Dearth o/Social Networking Priva-
cy Rights Revolutionized Online Government Surveillance, 31 PACE L. REV. 291, 338 (2011) (citing 
cases). 
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warrant?81 By treating public exposure and third-party access to personal 
information as waivers of Fourth Amendment protections, modem doctrine 
offers a difficult path to erecting protections against government surveil-
lance conducted by piecing together various public and private sector data 
with images posted online or captured in plain sight. 
2. Digital Age 
The Court has grappled for decades with the related question of 
whether-and the extent to which-government can use technology to en-
hance its ability to "see" what is arguably exposed to the public. It held in 
1983 that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of a 
car illuminated by a flashlight because "the use of artificial means to illu-
minate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search."282 Three years 
later, it found that warrantless naked-eye aerial observation of a fenced-in 
backyard was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment as "[a]ny 
member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have 
seen everything that these officers observed. "283 
In 2001, however, the Court recognized emerging technologies' priva-
cy implications when it decided that the use of thermal imaging technology 
to measure heat emanating from a home was a search because it amounted 
to "more than naked-eye surveillance" with "a device that is not in general 
public use."284 As Justice Alito recently described it, Kyllo v. United 
States285 was "a decision about the use of new technology."286 Writing for 
the majority in Florida v. Jardines,287 Justice Scalia similarly distinguished 
Kyllo as a case involving surveillance technology that allows law enforce-
ment to learn details "that would previously have been unknowable without 
physical intrusion."288 He reached the conclusion that a drug-sniffing police 
281 See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 FJd 1196,1204 (lOth Cir. 2008); see generally Semitsu, 
supra note 280, at 338 n.186 (citing cases). But see Warshak v. United States, 490 FJd 455, 473 (6th 
CiT. 2007) (holding that a sender of electronic mail has a reasonable expectation of privacy in messages 
residing with an ISP), vacated in part, 532 FJd 521 (6th CiT. 2008). 
282 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion); cf United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696,707 (1983) (finding no Fourth Amendment barrier to the "sui generis" use of a drug-
sniffing police dog). 
283 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986). 
284 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 40 (2001). As Katz itself arguably falls into this catego-
ry, the pre-digital and digital distinction is not a hard and fast one; it is simply offered as a way of un-
derstanding how Fourth Amendment doctrine must adapt to technology. 
285 533 U.S. 27 (200 I). 
286 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1425 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, 
along with Justices Kennedy and Breyer, joined the dissent. Justice Kagan suggested that Kyllo gov-
erned.ld. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
287 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
288 Id. at 1417 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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dog deployed from the front porch of a home constituted a Fourth Amend-
ment search despite "the antiquity" of forensic dogs as an investigative tool 
because there was no implicit license or invitation for the police to ap-
proach the home for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence in-
side.289 
Earlier, in City of Ontario v. Quon,290 the Court similarly highlighted 
the novelty of new technology as relevant to whether the user of a govern-
ment-issued pager had a reasonable expectation of privacy in messages 
retained by the service provider. Sidestepping the Fourth Amendment ques-
tion on the merits, Justice Kennedy cautioned that it "must proceed with 
care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in com-
munications made on electronic equipment," else it "risks error by elaborat-
ing too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technolo-
gy before its role in society has become clear."291 He explained that modem 
judges are not "on so sure a ground" as the Katz Court was in relying on 
"its own knowledge and experience to conclude that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a telephone booth."292 "Rapid changes in the dy-
namics of communication and information transmission are evident not just 
in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior," he 
continued, and "[ c ] ell phone and text message communications are so per-
vasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means ... for 
self-expression, even self-identification," thus potentially "strengthen[ing] 
the case for an expectation ofprivacy."293 
Two additional cases highlight the modem Court's struggle with fit-
ting modem technologies within the existing Fourth Amendment rubric. In 
United States v. Jones,294 the Court held that the warrantless installation of a 
global positioning system ("GPS") device to monitor the location of a pcr-
son's car constituted a search because the police "physically occupied pri-
vate property for the purpose of obtaining information."295 Justice Scalia 
thus revived for the majority the old, property-based approach to the Fourth 
Amendment296 instead of taking an arguably more obvious tactic: applying 
United States v. Knotts297 for the proposition that there is "no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in [a driver's] movements from one place to anoth-
289 Id. at 1416-17. 
290 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
291 Id. at 2629-30. 
292 Id. at 2629. 
293 Id. at 2629-30. Only Justice Scalia declined to join in this sentiment, although he did 
acknowledge that "[a]pplying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult." 
Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
294 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
295 !d. at 949. In reaching its holding, the majority thus undermined the staying power of Katz's 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy formulation for what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. 
296 Id. 
297 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
446 OEO. MASON L. REv. [VOL. 21:2 
er."298 Declaring Katz the inexclusive test, Justice Scalia confined it to 
"[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass,"299 while conceding that electronic surveillance "without an ac-
companying trespass" of a GPS device could amount "an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy" in a future case.300 
Justice Sotomayor301-and, separately, Justice Alito,302 joined by Jus-
tices Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan--expressed concern that modem tech-
nology is eroding individuals' ability to be free of government monitoring. 
She wrote that "electronic or other novel modes of surveillance [can] gen-
erate[] a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements 
that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations"-without any physical invasion of prop-
erty.303 The government, she added, can store and mine such data indefinite-
ly.304 Because modem electronic surveillance is cheap by comparison to 
traditional surveillance techniques, it "proceeds surreptitiously" and 
"evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement prac-
tices: 'limited police resources and community hostility. "'305 She referred to 
the Fourth Amendment's "goal to ... prevent 'a too permeating police sur-
veillance"'306 and questioned the propriety of the third-party doctrine as "ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks," such as phone numbers, URLs visited, corresponding email address-
es, "and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase" online.30? 
Although some people might accept this diminution of privacy as a 
"tradeoff' for access to technology or simply "inevitable," she expressed 
"doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclo-
298 Id. at 281. Similarly, in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013), Justice Scalia uti-
lized an implied license theory to find that the use of a drug-sniffing dog on a front porch of a home was 
a Fourth Amendment violation-rather than the established rule that "[w]ith few exceptions, the ques-
tion whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered 
no." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (200\). 
299 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. 
300 Jd. at 954. Justice Powell similarly warned in his Ciraolo dissent that "[t]echnological advances 
have enabled police to see people's activities and associations, and to hear their conversations, without 
being in physical proximity." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 218 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
301 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
302 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
303 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted); see also id. at 962-94 (Alito, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
304 Id. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
305 Id. at 956 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). FRT is even more probative 
than GPS tracking, as it can be immediately associated with a trove of online personal data, including 
browsing and buying habits and intimate communications with people who would not be identified with 
a GPS device. 
306 Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,595 (1948)). 
307 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. 
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sure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the 
last week, or month, or year. "308 
For his part, Justice Alito focused on the problem of "long-term moni-
toring," agreeing in principle with the majority that "we must 'assur[e] 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when 
the Fourth Amendment was adopted. "'309 Of course, he added, "it is almost 
impossible to think of late-18th-century situations" analogous to the capa-
bilities of modem surveillance technology.3IO The majority's physical tres-
pass theory, he explained, "would provide no protection" to "long-term 
monitoring ... accomplished without committing a technical trespass,'>3Il 
yet "[t]or such offenses, society's expectation has been that law enforce-
ment agents and others would not-and indeed, in the main, simply could 
not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individu-
al's car for a very long period."312 Justice Alito thus recognized that because 
"new devices" such as closed-circuit television video monitoring, automatic 
toll collection systems with recording technology, built-in GPS systems, 
and wireless tracking devices embedded in cell phones "permit the monitor-
ing of a person's movements" in ways that were impossible before the digi-
tal age, traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is inapposite.313 
Maryland v. Kint14 is the most recent case in which the Supreme 
Court addressed the vexing intersection of technology and privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment. At a booking on an arrest for assault, the police 
took a DNA sample by applying a buccal swab to the inside of a suspect's 
cheek.315 The DNA matched that of a rape victim taken six years earlier, 
leading to the arrestee's subsequent rape conviction.316 The DNA matching 
occurred through the Combined DNA Index System ("CaDIS"), which 
connects DNA data at the national, state, and local levels under FBI super-
vision.317 On appeal, a Maryland court held that the cheek swab was an un-
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.318 Reversing, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the majority that a Fourth Amendment search occurred, but 
that it was reasonable and did not require a warrant.319 For him, identifying 
an arrestee properly connotes "more than just" linking a name and social 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 950 (majority opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
310 Id. 
311 Id. at 961. 
312 ld.at964. 
313 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963. 
314 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
315 Id. at 1965. 
316 Id. 
317 ld.atI968. 
318 King v. State, 42 A.3d 549, 581 (Md. 2012), rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 1958. 
319 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965-66. 
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security number, but also "criminal history," aliases, photographs, and any 
other information that the police can obtain by "search[ing] the records 
already in their valid possession,'>32O such as "family ties, employment status 
and history, financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition, 
[and] length of residence in the community."321 Justice Kennedy suggested 
that DNA is a mere relative of fingerprinting,322 and that its value lies in 
allowing law enforcement "to make critical choices about how to proceed," 
ensuring that the accused remains available for trial, and helping protect the 
public from further harm-interests that, taken together, outweighed the 
arrestee's privacy interests in King.323 
Although King would appear to narrow the availability of Fourth 
Amendment protections against invasive new technologies, three aspects of 
Justice Kennedy's decision distinguish DNA sampling from the dragnet-
style surveillance of the general public which FRT makes possible. First, he 
emphasized that an arrestee's diminished expectations of privacy are distin-
guishable from those of "the public at large or a particular class of ... law-
abiding citizens."324 Second, Justice Kennedy stressed that technology could 
progress to the point at which the Fourth Amendment balance would be 
struck in the arrestee's favor, such as if DNA showed a "predisposition for 
a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity."325 It 
is thus possible that the Court would condemn the warrantless use of FRT 
on law-abiding citizens for particularly invasive purposes. Third, a Mary-
land statute forbidding the use of DNA for anything other than identifica-
tion "generally allay[ed] ... privacy concerns" at issue in King.326 In the 
absence of regulatory or statutory protections, the Court might grant the 
Constitution a greater role in protecting particular zones of privacy from 
unjustified government intrusion using FRT. 
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsberg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, took issue with Justice Kennedy's characterization 
of King's DNA matching as mere identification.327 For Justice Scalia, Jus-
tice Kennedy confused verification-the use of biometric data to confirm 
whether someone is whom he appears to be-with identification, which, 
properly understood, is more like "searching for evidence that [a person] 
has committed crimes unrelated to the crime of his arrest. "328 It "taxes the 
credulity of the credulous," Justice Scalia quipped, to assert that the DNA 
320 Id. at 1971-72. 
321 Id. at 1973 (quoting MD. R. 4-2 I 6(f)(I)(C)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
322 Id. at 1971-72. 
323 Id. at 1972-73. 
324 Id. at 1978. 
325 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
326 Id. at 1980 (second alteration in original) (quoting NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 750 
(2011)) (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 2-505(b)(I), 2-512(c) (LexisNexis 2011)). 
327 Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
328 Id. at 1982-83 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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in King was not in fact used to solve crimes,329 an aim "that ha[s] never 
been thought to justify a suspicionless search."330 Justice Scalia likened the 
practice to so-called "general warrants" at the time of the Founding-those 
"not grounded upon a sworn oath of a specific infraction by a particular 
individual, and thus not limited in scope and application."33I Justice Scalia 
also noted that the suspect's identity was already known when the state ran 
his DNA through the CODIS system long after he was arrested; the match-
ing was thus performed in order to identify the DNA sample from the 
rape-not to verify identity.332 What DNA offers that fingerprinting does 
not, he added, "is the ability to solve unsolved crimes, by matching old 
crime-scene evidence against the profiles of people whose identities are 
already known."333 Justice Scalia warned that "[i]f one believes that DNA 
will 'identify' someone arrested for assault, he must believe that it will 
'identify' someone arrested for a traffic offense."334 His dissent in King is 
thus an acknowledgement that some constitutional limits must be placed on 
the uses of surveillance technologies that enable government to create new 
information by identifying correlations among otherwise disparate data 
points: "Perhaps the construction of ... a genetic panopticon is wise," he 
wrote, "[b Jut I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liber-
ties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection."335 
B. Anonymity and the First Amendment 
Separately, a line of First Amendment cases confirms that the privacy 
threat posed by technologies like FRT -the government's unfettered identi-
fication and monitoring of personal associations, speech, activities, and 
beliefs, for no justifiable purpose-is one of constitutional dimension. In 
fact, the Supreme Court has steadfastly protected anonymous speech.336 
329 Id. at 1980. 
330 Id. at 1983. 
331 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980-8\. 
332 Id. at 1984. 
333 Id. at 1989. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 As Justice Sotomayor suggested in Jones, the use of FRT and other technologies for identifYing 
and tracking people may well give rise to a First Amendment claim in the appropriate case. See United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The aim of this Article is not to 
outline or further define whether a justiciable First Amendment case can be brought to limit the use of 
FRT for surveillance. Rather, it is to explore the intersection of First Amendment cases involving anon-
ymous speech and Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine in the hopes of identifYing a reinvigorated role 
for the Constitution in limiting the application of new technologies to public or third-party information 
for unprecedented surveillance. Arguably, the thesis has substantive due process implications. It also 
raises important questions regarding which branch of government is poised to enforce the constitutional 
values espoused here. These issues are beyond the scope of this Article. The Article more narrowly 
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The Court's repeated pronouncements that the First Amendmene37 
safeguards the right of anonymous speech-that is, the right to distribute 
written materials without personal identification of the author-largely 
came about in response to government attempts to mandate disclosures in 
public writings.338 In Talley v. Caiijornia,339 the Court struck down a Los 
Angeles ordinance restricting the distribution of a handbill "in any place 
under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover ... the 
name and address of ... [t]he person who printed, wrote, compiled or man-
ufactured the same."340 Finding that the law infringed on freedom of expres-
sion, the Court observed that "[a ]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures 
and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind" 
by enabling persecuted groups to criticize oppressive practices and other 
matters of public importance, particularly where the alternative may be not 
speaking at all.341 
The Talley Court342 relied on two cases that linked anonymous speech 
with the ability to freely associate in private. Both involved constitutional 
concludes that the anonymity value embodied in First Amendment protections must be brought to bear 
in evolving Fourth Amendment doctrine as well as legislative and regulatory responses to the privacy 
threats posed by FRT and other technologies for surveillance, and it outlines substantive guidelines for 
consideration in these efforts. 
337 U.S. CON ST. amend. I (prohibiting the making of any "law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievanc-
es"). 
338 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) ("[AJn author's decision to 
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publica-
tion, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment."). While anonymous 
speech is protected, legislatures and courts have attempted to distinguish between "expressive" anonym-
ity and anonymity used in the furtherance of criminal activity (or as a crime itself), referred to as "func-
tional" anonymity. Though it is sometimes difficult to draw a bright line between the two, courts gener-
ally find that the latter does not warrant First Amendment protection. See Margot Kaminski, Real Masks 
and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 815, 817-18 (2013). 
339 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
340 [d. at 60-61 (citing L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 28.06 (1960». 
341 [d. at 64-65; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1960) (striking down as overly 
broad state statute requiring public school teachers to file affidavits giving names of organizations to 
which they had belonged or contributed within the preceding five years as a condition of employment). 
But see New York ex rei. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (\928) (upholding state's enforcement of 
membership disclosure laws against Ku Klux Klan); NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449, 465-66 (1958) (distinguishing Bryant on its facts). See generally Comment, The Constitutional 
Rightto Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE LJ. 1084, 1088 (1961 )(discussing 
Zimmerman and other early Supreme Court cases bearing upon a constitutional right to anonymity). 
342 Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
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challenges343 to laws requiring members of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") to furnish government offi-
cials with its member lists. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson,344 the 
lower court imposed a $100,000 civil contempt fine after the organization 
refused to comply with a court order requiring production of its lists. 345 The 
Supreme Court lifted the judgment and fine, holding that "immunity from 
state scrutiny of membership lists ... is here so related to the right of the 
members to pursue their lawful private interests privately" as to be constitu-
tionally protected on privacy and free association grounds. 346 Although "as-
sociation" is not listed among the First Amendment's enumerated freedoms, 
the Court declared in Talley that "freedom to engage in association for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of ... 'liber-
ty. "'347 
In Bates v. City of Little Rock,348 the NAACP's records custodian was 
tried, convicted, and fined for refusing to comply with state ordinances re-
quiring that membership lists "be public and subject to the inspection of any 
interested party at all reasonable business hours."349 The organization 
claimed a right on the part of its members to participate in NAACP activi-
ties anonymously and "free from any restraints or interference from city or 
state officials"-a right that it felt "has been recognized as the basic right of 
every American citizen since the founding of this country."350 The Supreme 
Court again struck down the ordinances, asserting that the freedom of 
speech, a free press, freedom of association, and a right to peaceably as-
semble are protected "from being stifled by [such] subtle governmental 
influence" as a requirement to divulge membership lists. 351 
343 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 517 (1960); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451. The claims 
were brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which makes the First Amend-
ment applicable to the states. See id. 
344 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
345 Id. at 452-54. 
346 Id. at 462, 466. The NAACP Court took pains to note that the group had made "an uncontro-
verted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has ex-
posed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other 
manifestations of public hostility," but the Court found no compelling state interest in obtaining the lists. 
Id. at 462, 464. 
347 Id. at 460. In Griswold, Justice Douglas construed associational freedom as falling within the 
First Amendment's "penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion" and otherwise 
"necessary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
483 (1965); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25 (1977) (quoting Griswold); Cal. Bankers 
Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Financial transactions can reveal 
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon 
these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy."). 
348 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
349 Id. at 518. 
350 Id. at 520-21. 
351 Id. at 523. 
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Over four decades later, the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission characterized anonymous speech as important to the preserva-
tion of personal privacy.352 In McIntyre, the plaintiff distributed leaflets 
opposing a school superintendent's referendum which were anonymously 
attributed to "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS."353 The 
Ohio Election Commission fmed the plaintiff for violating state laws ban-
ning the distribution of unsigned leaflets. 354 The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed a lower court ruling upholding the ordinance, explaining that "an 
author's decision to remain anonymous ... is an aspect of the freedom of 
speech protected by the First Amendment"-even if "[t]he decision in favor 
of anonymity [is] motivated ... merely by a desire to preserve as much of 
one's privacy as possible."355 The Court extolled the virtues of anonymity as 
fostering "[g]reat works of literature ... under assumed names," enabling 
groups to criticize the government without the threat of persecution, and 
"provid[ing] a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure 
that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like 
its proponent."356 As "core political speech," it concluded, "[n]o form of 
speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection."357 
Justice Stevens went on in his majority opinion to tether anonymity to 
the purpose behind the Bill of Rights and the First Amendment: "to protect 
unpopular individuals from retaliation-and their ideas from suppression-
at the hand of an intolerant society."358 "Anonymity," he explained, "is a 
shield from the tyranny of the majority."359 In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Thomas commented that the Founders' "practices and beliefs" on the sub-
ject "indicate[] that they believed the freedom of the press to include the 
right to author anonymous political articles and pamphlets."36o "That most 
other Americans shared this understanding," he added, "is reflected in the 
Federalists' hasty retreat before the withering criticism of their assault on 
the liberty of the press."361 Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that anonymity 
"facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily [its] 
very purpose."362 To treat "all anonymous communication ... in our society 
352 514 U.S. 334, 342, 347 (1995). 
353 Id. at 337 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
354 Id. at 338. 
355 Jd. at 341-42. 
356 Jd. 
357 ld.at347. 
358 Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
359 Id. (citing J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
I, 3-4 (R. B. McCallum ed., 1948)). 
360 Id. at 360, 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
361 Id. at 364. 
362 Jd. at 385 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia flatly rejected the notion that "a 'right to ano-
nymity' is such a prominent value in our constitutional system that even protection of the electoral 
process cannot be purchased at its expense." /d. at 379. In his view, "[a]nonymity can still be enjoyed by 
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[as] traditionally sacrosanct," he continued, "seems to me a distortion of the 
past that will lead to a coarsening of the future. "363 
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of 
Stratton,364 the Court struck down an ordinance requiring permits for door-
to-door canvassing as a prior restraint on speech but also because the law 
vitiated the possibility of anonymous speech.365 It characterized the permit 
requirement as "result[ing] in a surrender of ... anonymity"--even where 
"circulators revealed their physical identities"-because "strangers to the 
resident certainly maintain their anonymity."366 The Court was thus un-
moved by the fact that speakers who ring doorbells necessarily make them-
selves physically known to their audience, thus revealing themselves to 
some extent. For the Court, it was the recognition that occurs when a name 
on a permit is connected to a face which triggered the Constitution's protec-
tion of anonymity. 
Most recently, a fractured plurality in Doe v. Reecf67 upheld a state law 
compelling public disclosure of the identities of referendum petition signa-
tories while squarely acknowledging the vitality of a First Amendment right 
to anonymous speech.368 Significantly, all but one Justice recognized that 
the government's ability to correlate identifying information with online 
data created a First Amendment hazard of unprecedented dimension. Writ-
ing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that an individual's ex-
pression of a political view through a signature on a referendum petition 
implicated a First Amendment right,369 The Court nonetheless held that the 
state's interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process and in-
forming the public about who supports a petition justified the burdens of 
compelled disclosure.l70 Justice Roberts made a point of deeming "signifi-
cant" the plaintiffs' argument that, "once on the Internet," their names and 
addresses could be matched with other publicly available information about 
them "in what will effectively become a blueprint for harassment and intim-
those who require it, without utterly destroying useful disclosure laws." Id. at 380. Justice Scalia's 
answer is to require a showing of a "'reasonable probability' that the compelled disclosure would result 
in 'threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties, '" consistent with 
the disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act.ld. at 379 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1,74 (1976) (per curiam)). 
363 Id. at 379. 
364 536 U.S. ISO (2002). 
365 See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1037·38 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Watchtower 
Bible & Tract Soc 'y). 
366 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc 'y, 536 U.S. at 166-67. 
367 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
368 Id. at 2815. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion. Justices Breyer, Alito, and 
Sotomayor each wrote separately, while Justices Stevens and Scalia wrote opinions concurring in the 
judgment. Justice Thomas dissented. 
369 Id. at 2817. 
370 Id. at 2819. 
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idation."371 Because the majority only considered the facial challenge to the 
law, Justice Roberts found the burdens imposed by "typical referendum 
petitions" unlike those that the plaintiffs feared.372 
Justice Alito wrote separately to emphasize that government access to 
personal data online gave rise to a strong as-applied challenge based on the 
"individual ... right to privacy of belief and association.'>373 He considered 
"breathtaking" the implications of the state's argument that it has an interest 
in providing information to the public about supporters of a referendum 
petition; if true, "the State would be free to require petition signers to dis-
close all kinds of demographic information, including the signer's race, 
religion, political affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnic background, and 
interest-group memberships."374 Justice Alito added that the posting of 
names and addresses online could allow "anyone with access to a computer 
[to] compile a wealth of information about all of those persons," with vast 
potential for use in harassment.375 Justice Thomas dissented on similar 
grounds, asserting that he would sustain a facial challenge precisely be-
cause "[t]he advent of the Internet enables rapid dissemination of the in-
formation needed to threaten or harass every referendum signer," thus 
"chill[ing] protected First Amendment activity."376 Concurring separately, 
Justice Scalia stood alone in his complete rejection of First Amendment 
protections for anonymous speech.377 
371 [d. at 2820. 
372 [d. at 2821. 
373 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2824 (Ali to, J., concurring). 
374 [d. 
375 [d. at 2825. Justice Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion in which Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg joined. She suggested "the State's decision to make accessible what [citizens] voluntarily place in 
the public sphere should not deter them from engaging in the expressive act of petition signing," and she 
distinguished NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson on the grounds that case-specific relief is appropriate 
if there is a reasonable probability of harassment. See id. at 2828-29 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958». In a separate concurrence in which Justice 
Breyer joined, Justice Stevens emphasized that, unlike in McIntyre, the law "does not ... require that 
any person signing a petition disclose or say anything at all." !d. at 2829 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995». Justice Sotomayor's suggestion that 
First Amendment protections for privacy of belief or associations are waived upon public disclosure of 
one's identity seems at odds with her critique of the Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine. See supra 
notes 301-308 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012». 
376 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 982 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part» (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
377 Justice Scalia equated the signing of a referendum with acting as a legislator-not a voter; 
"when the people exercised legislative power directly, they did so not anonymously, but openly in town 
hall meetings." [d. at 2834 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). He also characterized the case as 
claiming that public disclosure of signatories' identifYing information "violates their First Amendment 
right to anonymity," and suggested that "[t]oday's opinion acknowledges such a right." Jd. at 2832. 
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When considered in conjunction with the digital-age Fourth Amend-
ment cases, Doe is remarkable in its recognition of the pressures that mod-
ern technology puts on the viability of existing constitutional doctrine relat-
ing to individual privacy. Although Jones addressed GPS monitoring under 
the Fourth Amendment, Justice Sotomayor invoked the First Amendment to 
emphasize that "[a ]wareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms," and that "the Government's unre-
strained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is 
susceptible to abuse.'>37S When inexpensive technology is paired with mas-
sive amounts of readily accessible personal information and "unfettered" 
government discretion to track individual citizens, she explained, democra-
cy itself suffers.379 Although pre-digital-age Fourth Amendment case law 
appears to paint FRT surveillance into a doctrinal corner, in the right case 
the Supreme Court may well find constitutional limits on surveillance con-
ducted with cutting-edge technology like FRT and publicly available data. 
The next Part offers guidelines derived from the Court's Fourth and First 
Amendment jurisprudence which courts and legislators should bear in mind 
in crafting legal limits on surveillance through technologies like FRT.3s0 
Ill. RECLAIMING THE CONSTITUTION'S ROLE IN PROTECTING 
ANONYMITY 
To address the privacy threats posed by modern technology, scholars 
have argued for recognition of a wholesale constitutional right to anonymi-
ty, as well as robust enforcement of First Amendment protections of that 
Justice Stevens disagreed, stating that "[tJhc right ... is the right to speak, not the right ... to speak 
anonymously." [d. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
378 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
379 See id. 
380 Note that there would likely be a formidable Article III justiciability problem to a First 
Amendment challenge to the government's use of third party information and technology for its own 
surveillance. In California Bankers, the Court found unripe the American Civil Liberties Union's claim 
that the banks' record keeping requirements violated the First Amendment as they "could possibly be 
used to obtain the identities of its members and contributors through the examination of the organiza-
tion's bank records." Cal. Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55-56 (1974) (emphasis added). In 
Laird v. Tatum, the Court similarly found no standing to challenge the Army's practice of collecting and 
storing "information about public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil 
disorder." 408 U.S. I, 6 (1972). The Court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to press a claim that 
"the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence, without more, of a 
governmental investigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is 
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose." fd. at 10. In dissent, 
Justice Douglas argued that "[tJhere is ... no law authorizing surveillance over civilians, which in this 
case the Pentagon concededly had undertaken," yet "[0 Jne can search the Constitution in vain for any 
such authority." Id. at 16 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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right in the face of widespread technological surveillance of the public. 381 A 
plethora of scholarship has also arisen in response to the problems of new 
technologies under existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Like Justice 
Sotomayor in Jones, some commenters have called for the end of the third 
party doctrine,382 reconsideration of the case law truncating the Fourth 
Amendment's reach in public spaces,383 and adoption of new theories for 
understanding the Fourth Amendment guarantee altogether.384 
This Part seeks to reclaim the Constitution's relevance in protecting 
anonymity in the digital age by identifying points at which the Supreme 
Court's First Amendment cases on anonymity and its modem Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence intersect. FRT and related technologies employ 
big data to make correlations that help predict the future in ways that were 
impossible only a few years ago. 385 It is through such correlations that FRT 
enables users to recognize-versus merely see-a subject, and from that 
data erect a comprehensive portrait of that person's past, present, and future 
life. At least three guidelines can be inferred from the Court's First and 
Fourth Amendment cases which courts, legislators, and regulators should 
take into account in responding to the privacy challenges posed by such 
technologies' unlimited access to the whereabouts, activities, interests, as-
sociations, and beliefs of virtually any member of society. First, the intend-
381 Slobogin, supra note 23, at 217 (observing that "we all possess a 'right to anonymity,' even 
when in public," under the Fourth Amendment); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a 
Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 749 
(2008) (arguing that "the First Amendment right to freedom of association provides the strongest basis 
for regulating relational surveillance" and identifying "suggestive principles from Fourth Amendment 
doctrine about how surveillance regulation must respond to technological change"); Timothy Zick, 
Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 
I, 3-4 (2007) (providing "a comprehensive assessment of the First Amendment issues related to the 
networking of public places" and categorizing the speech issues into six basic clusters); see Lynch, 
supra note 205, at 235 (arguing that free speech under the First Amendment should be expanded "to 
encompass a speaker's right to choose a private audience"). 
382 Compare Henderson, supra note 140, at 45, with Kerr, supra note 274, at 566 (taking different 
approaches to the third party doctrine). 
383 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note 23, at 312-13 ("Whether framed in the Court's language-in 
terms of expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable--or in mine-in terms of 
a right to anonymity that protects against unnecessary government scrutiny-that threshold is crossed 
when government trains cameras on its citizens, because of the panoptic atmosphere such surveillance 
creates .... "); id. at 270-71 & n.255 (citing scholarship "to show that the Court's public expo-
sure/assumption of risk approach to the Fourth Amendment is misguided"). 
384 See, e.g., Citron & Gray, supra note 185, at 270 (arguing that "continuous and indiscriminate 
surveillance ... is damaging because it violates reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy, by 
which we mean privacy interests in large aggregations of information that are independent from particu-
lar interests in constituent parts of that whole"); Kerr, supra note 125, at 313 (discussing "mosaic" 
theory of Fourth Amendment); Slobogin, supra note 23, at 258-67 (arguing that a right to anonymity 
additionally derives from a right to travel under the Due Process Clause and from a general right to 
privacy in the penumbras ofthe First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
385 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at 52-53. 
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ed use of technologically derived data should be treated as a significant 
factor in assessing the proper constitutional, statutory, and regulatory scope 
of government activity that has the potential to expose an individual's pri-
vacy to scrutiny. Second, and accordingly, the law should place boundaries 
around the ability of government to match faceprints with other data points 
for purposes other than verification of an individual's known identity. 
Third, courts and lawmakers should keep in mind that legislative protection 
of an individual's ability to invoke anonymity-through conspicuous and 
mandatory opt-out provisions for web tracking, for example-is constitu-
tionally prudent, ifnot necessary. 
A. Recognition Through Correlation 
As the First Amendment cases indicate, anonymity implies a freedom 
from being recognized-versus just being seen. In spite of surveillance 
technology's reach, people still expect to mostly avoid recognition while 
going about their daily routines. As technology changes the way infor-
mation is collected and used, however, the viability of that assumption is 
eroding. Big data "is about predictions."386 It operates by "applying math to 
huge quantities of data in order to infer probabilities," such as "the likeli-
hood that an email message is spam; that the typed letters 'teh' are sup-
posed to be 'the'; that the trajectory and velocity of a person jay-walking 
mean he'll make it across the street in time" to avoid a driverless car; and 
even that a person is a criminal "before one actually commits a crime."387 It 
is the linkage of a faceprint with a name, a Facebook tag, a driving record, 
and real-time footage from an airport or ATM camera-not just the collec-
tion of the faceprint itself-which remains unaccounted for in prevailing 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court has construed the First 
Amendment as protecting speech that enables recognition by the govern-
ment. If extended to the Fourth Amendment context, this idea would help 
modernize what it means to perform a search with technology which does 
not result in a physical trespass. 
In both the First and Fourth Amendment arenas, the Court has treated 
"the right ... to pursue ... lawful private interests privately" as constitu-
tionally protected from government interference.388 Yet it has never sug-
gested that the public disclosure of one's face is itself an act of constitu-
tional dimension. In addressing anonymity, the Court has instead drawn a 
distinction between mere observance of "physical identities" and recogni-
386 Id. at II. 
387 Id. at 12. 
388 NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); see also Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886) (framing the Fourth Amendment question as implicating the "indefea-
sible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property"). 
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tion.389 A stranger knocking on a door might remain anonymous even 
though his face is visible. A "surrender of ... anonymity" takes place when 
the face is linked to other identifying information, such as a name on a 
pamphlet.390 Chief Justice Roberts extended this principle to modern tech-
nology when he emphasized in Doe v. Reed that "once on the Internet" 
names and addresses contained in referendum petitions could be matched 
with other data "in what will effectively become a blueprint for harassment 
and intimidation.'>391 Similarly, Justice Alito deemed "breathtaking" the 
implications of the government's ability to match referendum petition in-
formation with other online data.392 And Justice Thomas associated chilled 
speech with the "advent of the Internet" and "rapid dissemination" of per-
sonal information that may be used "to threaten or harass every referendum 
signer."393 Forcing individuals to enable others to recognize them through 
public writings is anathema to First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association.394 
Standing alone, a photo is likewise of limited investigative utility. 
"With big data," its value "is now in secondary uses."395 FRT works by 
"electronically matching aspects of each person's appearance against bio-
metric or other databases."396 Using a single image, government can "probe 
our lives after the fact" by, for example, "figuring out what specific medical 
or social problem led . . . to a certain source of help."397 It does this by 
drawing correlations between a faceprint and other information contained in 
databases or online. In his concurring opinion in Whalen v. Roe,398 Justice 
Brennan was presciently "troubl[ ed]" by "the central computer storage of 
the data ... collected" back in 1977 because it allowed government to ma-
nipulate information in ways that could harm privacy interests--even 
though the Fourth Amendment did not shield the information itself from 
389 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166-67 (2002). 
390 Id. at 166. 
391 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law 
Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198-200 (1999) (invaliding Colorado law requiring identification badges 
when soliciting signatures for ballot initiatives as it "forces circulators to reveal their identities at the 
same time they deliver their political message," thus exposing them to '''heat of the moment' harass-
ment"-"at the precise moment when the circulator's interest in anonymity is greatest" (quoting Am. 
Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1102 (lOth Cir. 1997), ajJ'd sub nom. Buck-
ley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
392 Doe, 130 S. Ct. at 2824 (Alito, J., concurring). 
393 Id. at 2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 982 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
394 Id. at 2843. 
395 MA YER-SCH0NBERGER & CUK1ER, supra note II, at 153. 
396 Blitz, supra note 148, at 1356. 
397 Id. at 1358. 
398 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
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government scrutiny in that case.399 In his view, "[t]he central storage and 
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for 
abuse of that information."400 "[F]uture developments," he suggested, might 
one day "demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology."40I In 
United States v. Knotts, the Court similarly acknowledged that, if "dragnet 
type law enforcement practices" such as twenty-four-hour surveillance 
"without judicial knowledge or supervision ... should eventually occur, 
there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional 
principles may be applicable."402 
That time has come. Technology has progressed to the point at which 
FRT and big data can be used to make predictions about people's behavior. 
This occurs through the analysis of "the statistical relationship between two 
data values.''403 "[I]f A often takes place together with B," law enforcement 
might conclude that "we need to watch out for B to predict that A will hap-
pen."404 A correlation between the two data points assumes that if one data 
value changes, the other is likely to change as wel1.405 In the foregoing ex-
ample, B operates as a proxy for what is probably happening with A, even if 
A's future activity cannot be directly observed.406 Target stores' marketing 
toward mothers-to-be provides an impactful example of the power of big-
data correlations in the private sector. By reviewing the shopping histories 
of women with baby registries, Target identified products that correlate 
with pregnancy and calculated "pregnancy prediction" scores for new cus-
tomers; it then sent customers coupons tailored to individual due dates that 
it estimated with astonishing accuracy.407 Similarly, although a faceprint 
algorithm in and of itself is just a numerical record of something that has 
already been made public, the correlation of that data with other infor-
mation for predictive surveillance is altogether different. "The data may not 
even explicitly seem like personal information, but with big-data processes 
it can easily be traced back to the individual it refers to. Or intimate details 
about a person's life can be deduced."408 
The Supreme Court's view that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in things made public has thus been criticized for narrowly defining 
399 Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
400 Id. at 607. 
401 Id. 
402 460 U.S. 276, 283-85 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that beeper signals did 
not invade reasonable expectations of privacy). 
403 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note I 1, at 52. 
404 Id. at 53. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. 
407 Id. at 57-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
408 Id. at 152. 
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privacy as mere secrecy.409 Correlating an image with other data contained 
in a database is more intrusive than mere visual surveillance. People do not 
expect that many passersby recognize their faces, let alone associate them 
with Internet behavior or travel patterns.4IO Even if the gathering of a 
faceprint from a public closed-circuit camera is unobjectionable, its correla-
tion with other big data produces new surveillance information that the sub-
ject did not knowingly convey. 
The First Amendment anonymity cases indicate that the action of cor-
relating FR T data with other information for purposes of identifying an 
otherwise anonymous person therefore should trigger the same constitu-
tional scrutiny that applies to other means of surveillance such as the GPS 
device in Jones. 411 Whether the government retrieves the requisite image 
through a classic physical invasion of property should not determine wheth-
er the correlation process is constitutionally confined. Nor should the public 
or third-party nature of the data collected undermine the Constitution's role 
in protecting against the use of such data for omnipresent government mon-
itoring. Instead, as the Court implied in Jardines,412 new technology should 
be afforded distinct modes of Fourth Amendment analysis. The action of 
correlating numerical faceprints with other data amounts to "more than na-
ked-eye surveillance of a home" with "a device that is not in general public 
use" under Kyllo's formulation.4I3 As Justice Sotomayor explained in Jones, 
modern methods of government monitoring rely on data mining and stor-
age, "proceed[] surreptitiously" and cheaply, and "evade[] the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices."414 Technology 
has enabled the government to "generate[] a precise, comprehensive record 
of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations."415 This 
novel use of bits of data defies what Justice Alito called "society's expecta-
tion ... that law enforcement agents and others would not-and indeed, in 
409 SOLOVE, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing theorists); see also Gutterman, supra note 103, at 
665-66 (critiquing the Katz formulation as "too dependent upon a finding of objective measures used to 
protect privacy" and "thereby a risk-assumption theory" of the Fourth Amendment). 
410 If an individual controls the database used for matching-such as a Facebook account-there 
may be an argument that the government's probing of such data constitutes an unreasonable search of 
that person's "effects" under the Fourth Amendment. But see, e.g., United States v. Gabel, No. 10-
60168, 2010 WL 3927697, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2010) (rejecting argument that subject had a 
reasonable expectation that only users logging onto a network in a usual manner would see his infor-
mation, and that law enforcement's use of enhanced technologies for searching violated the Fourth 
Amendment), ajJ'd, 470 F. App'x 853 (11th Cir. 2012). 
411 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 89-90 (1995). 
412 See supra notes 287-289 and accompanying text. 
413 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 40 (2001). 
414 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
415 Id. at 955. 
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the main, simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue [one's] every 
single movement" over a long period oftime.416 
B. Limited Use of Data 
The Court's First Amendment approach to anonymity and its Fourth 
Amendment treatment of technology in the digital age further suggest that, 
doctrinally, the collection of data might be constitutional for one use but not 
for another. FRT analysis allows users to make predictions about a subject's 
behavior which can be tremendously useful in preventing crime but also 
hugely problematic in terms of personal privacy and autonomy. Even if the 
collection of personal data through public interfaces is lawful, the Constitu-
tion could confine the extent to which law enforcement can employ new 
technologies for predictive surveillance. 
In their opinions in Doe, Justices Alito and Thomas suggested that 
there is a meaningful distinction under the First Amendment between using 
personal information contained on referendum petitions for verification and 
using the information for other purposes.417 Unlike verification, identifica-
tion links a face with a wealth of personal information about an individual 
from the Internet and other public and private sources, such as birth date 
and place, medical data, affiliated friends and organizations, and criminal 
history. This data can be put toward law enforcement aims that go well be-
yond verification that a person is in fact whom he claims to be. Justice Scal-
ia emphasized as much in his Maryland v. King dissent, when he assailed 
the majority for characterizing the government's use of the suspect's DNA 
as unrelated to crime solving.4lR He explained in great detail how the police 
employed the DNA sample to "solve unsolved crimes, by matching old 
crime-scene evidence against the profiles of people whose identities [were] 
already known."419 In Jardines, as well, Justice Scalia suggested that the 
intended use of a technology (such as a drug-sniffing dog) is an important 
element of the Fourth Amendment analysis.420 He distinguished between 
licensed and unlicensed entries into a curtilage (e.g., knocking on a door 
versus arriving with a bloodhound or a metal detector) and suggested that 
"[a]n invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does 
not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker."421 As to the reasonableness 
416 Id. at 964 (Ali to, J., concurring in the judgment). 
417 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2826 (2010) (Ali to, J., concurring) (observing that the state laws 
suggest that signatory infonnation should be confidential except for verification); id. at 2847 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (observing that the rules allowing for review of the secretary of state's verification deci-
sions were not in question). 
418 133 S. Ct. 1958,1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
419 Id. at 1989. 
420 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013). 
421 Id. 
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of a search, Justice Scalia similarly observed that it "depends upon whether 
the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends 
upon the purpose for which they entered."422 
If-unlike the DNA in King-faceprints were used for surveillance of 
common citizens, a majority of the Court might find that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to limit the use of such data for secondary purposes 
that include identification versus mere verification of identity. The First 
Amendment anonymity cases provide insight into how courts might deter-
mine whether a secondary use of faceprint data is constitutional. In McIn-
tyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, for example, the Court credited the 
state's interest in preventing fraud and libel during elections "when false 
statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the pub-
lic at large," but found it insufficient under the "exacting scrutiny" applica-
ble to core political speech.423 Under that standard, "[t]he simple interest in 
providing voters with additional relevant information" did not justify the 
anonymity ban, which did little to help voters evaluate the pamphlet's mes-
sage.424 
By the same token, "[t]he FBI shouldn't be in the business of monitor-
ing demonstrations unless it has a cause, a tip, a reason. "425 In order to de-
velop meaningful constitutional distinctions between the various possible 
uses of facial data collected in the public sphere, the Court's identification 
of the government's rationale for collecting personal information in the 
First Amendment cases could be extrapolated to the Fourth Amendment 
context. In other words, if anonymity warrants constitutional protection 
under the First Amendment, some requisite showing should be made before 
the government can perform a matching that results in monitoring of an 
individual's activity as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, as well. 426 Low-
er courts have held that before the government can utilize fingerprint evi-
dence gathered from the general public, it must demonstrate probable cause. 
If the government cannot show probable cause, it must at least show an 
articulable suspicion to believe that the person committed a criminal of-
fense and that fingerprinting will establish or negate the person's connec-
tion to the offense.427 FRT should be treated no differently.428 Whether fash-
422 ld.atI417. 
423 514 u.s. 334,347,349 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
424 Id. at 348-49. 
425 Spencer, supra note 157 (quoting Gregory Nojeim, senior counsel at the Center for Democracy 
and Technology). 
426 This factor, of course, raises its own host of issues-such as what anonymity means for purpos-
es of evaluating levels of Fourth Amendment scrutiny and protection-which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
427 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 u.s. 811, 813-18 (\985) ("There is ... support in our cases for the 
view that the Fourth Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for 
believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect's connection with that crime, and if the 
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ioned as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or something else, First 
Amendment doctrine suggests that the government should have to justify its 
correlation ofFRT data with other information to form a working profile of 
citizens who otherwise abide by the law.429 
C. The Importance of Choice 
With the exception of Doe, an important distinguishing feature of the 
First Amendment anonymity cases is the involvement of legislative at-
tempts to coerce the disclosure of personal identities. FRT presents a par-
ticularly difficult problem under prevailing constitutional law because most 
faces are routinely exposed in public. No domestic law requires that a per-
son's facial features be unobstructed while she maneuvers about in public 
places so that the government can use them for identification purposes. Her 
visage is there for the government's taking. Technology has thus become 
deterministic of personal privacy today. Yet there is no reciprocal power on 
the part of individuals to direct how technology will evolve in relationship 
procedure is carried out with dispatch. Of course, neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause would 
suffice to pennit the officers to make a warrantless entry into a person's house for the purpose of obtain-
ing fingerprint identification." (citation omitted)); cf Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1987 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that "our cases provide no ready answer to th[e] question" of whether 
taking a person's fingerprints amounts to a Fourth Amendment search); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 
721,728 (1969) ("We have no occasion in this case ... to detennine whether the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course 
of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no prohable cause to ar-
rest."). By contrast, courts have found that routine "booking" procedures may require fingerprint identi-
fication, regardless of whether investigation of the crime involves fingerprint evidence. See, e.g., Napo-
litano v. United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) ("Taking of fingerprints [prior to bail] is 
universally standard procedurc, and no violation of constitutional rights."); Smith v. United States, 324 
F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("[I]t is elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to 
submit to ... fingerprinting ... as part of routine identification processes."). 
428 See, e.g., Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1057-59 (Colo. 2002) (en 
banc) (applying the Supreme Court's recognition of a First Amendment interest in anonymity to a 
search warrant issued to a third party and holding that a warrant to obtain infonnation about an individ-
ual's purchases from a bookseller could not be enforced without a heightened showing of the need for 
customers' book purchase records). Other courts have held that the privacy or anonymity interest of a 
party seeking to prevent a subpoena to a third party weakens if the party made disclosures to that third 
party in exchange for a service. E.g., Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d I, 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) 
(upholding a warrant for subscriber records from an ISP because he had knowingly revealed his identity 
to the [SP, whose employees had access to that infonnation). 
429 Cf MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at 176 (recommending that governments 
be required (1) to disclose their data and algorithms to the public, (2) to have algorithms certified by 
third parties prior to use in making predictions, and (3) to specify concrete ways in which individuals 
can disprove predictions made through big data correlations); Lee Tien, Privacy, Technology and Data 
Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389,405 (2004) (arguing that the lack of particularized suspicion to run a 
data search amounts to a violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
464 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 21:2 
to their privacy interests or even to opt out of its implications for their daily 
lives. 
The First Amendment anonymity cases and Fourth Amendment doc-
trine assume that a person possesses the discretion to take steps to protect 
communications or other effects from governmental intrusion-that is, by 
keeping personal information private. In the First Amendment context, the 
Court has upheld private individuals' ability to choose to keep their identi-
ties anonymous in some respect. Indeed, the fact that the McIntyre plaintiff 
simultaneously disclosed her identity in other pamphlets was irrelevant to 
the Court's analysis and ultimate conclusion that her choice to remain 
anonymous was protected by the First Amendment.43o In the Fourth 
Amendment arena, disclosure operates as a waiver of sorts, but the Court 
has taken pains to identify how the subject of police inquiry could have 
effectively invoked constitutional protections by keeping information pri-
vate. In both contexts, the underlying assumption supporting the Court's 
analyses of the constitutional guarantee at issue is that citizens have a 
choice and--caveat emptor-if they choose public disclosure, the Constitu-
tion cannot save them from the consequences ofthat choice. 
Facebook's FRT features are active by default.431 It takes six clicks to 
reach a disclosure that Facebook uses FRT.432 Apple's iPhoto does not have 
an opt-out function at al1.433 Currently, there are no laws requiring private 
entities to provide individuals with notice that they are collecting personal 
data using FR T, how long that data will be stored, whether and how it will 
be shared, or how it will be used.434 Other countries have regulations that 
give Internet users control over their own data.435 In the United States, how-
ever, private companies are free to sell, trade, and profit from individuals' 
biometric information. Private companies can also disclose individuals' 
data to government authorities without their consent.436 
430 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
431 Blue, supra note 47. 
432 Ian Duncan, Senator Questions Facebook Exec About Facial-Recognition Feature, L.A. TIMES 
(July 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.coml2012/juVI8lbusiness/la-fi-senate-facebook-20120719. 
433 jhon jabir, How Facebook's Face Recognition Challenges Privacy, SEETECHNO.COM (July 18, 
20 12), http://seetechno.comlhow-face books-face-recogni tion-challenges-pri vacy/. 
434 Blue, supra note 47. 
435 See generally Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection! (last visited Nov. 24,2013). 
436 See Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation?: Data Mining, National Security and the "Adverse 
Inference" Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 757,758 (2006) ("Since Septem-
ber II, 2001, the federal government has tried to connect more 'dots' (data points) to prevent terror-
ism-by piecing together pieces of information and data to uncover possible plots and patterns. As part 
of this effort, the Executive Branch has introduced various proposals to 'mine' private sector commer-
cial databases and public records (as well as public databases) for information on everything from con-
sumer addresses to financial and credit profiles. Such information, when fed into computers and ana-
lyzed, is meant to help the U.S. government predict who might be involved in terrorist activity."). 
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Fourth and First Amendment law is remarkably consistent in its defer-
ence to the subject's choice to remain anonymous or put information into 
the public domain. If people protect their privacy, the Constitution protects 
it too. In modem times, the problem with this tautology is that the concept 
of choice implies that there is more than one meaningful option. With FRT 
and other emerging technologies, there is no mechanism for opting out of 
the various sources that are amalgamated into what amounts to surveillance. 
The theory behind the Fourth Amendment doctrines that lift its protections 
for information disclosed publicly or to third parties is thus unsustainable. 
Accordingly, the recognition of anonymity as a constitutional value 
that warrants protection under the First and Fourth Amendments may re-
quire "numerous safeguards" in place for forestalling "indiscriminate dis-
closure," as Justice Brennan suggested in Whalen.437 In his words, whether 
sophisticated storage and matching technology "amount[ s] to a deprivation 
of constitutionally protected privacy interests" might depend in part on 
congressional or regulatory protections put in place to forbid the govern-
ment's use of big data for arbitrary monitoring of the populace without in-
dividuals' consent.438 This will not be easy. Choosing to "opt out" of 
Google's tracking technologies itself leaves a trace, and technology exists 
to "re-identify" people whose personal identifiers, such as name, address, 
credit card information, birth date, and social security number had been 
removed from a dataset. 439 But constitutional limits on the government's 
ability to work around individuals' attempts to protect their privacy would 
be an important step toward rescuing the constitutional value of anonymity 
before FRT and big data are used to do more than simply predict who may 
commit crimes-i.e., to punish people for future acts.440 
437 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607 (I 977) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
438 Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (citing Kerr, supra note 125, at 805-06). One option is to have a comprehensive privacy law 
incorporating informed consent requirements, like many European countries have, with a "privacy 
commissioner" responsible for addressing technological developments in a regulatory environment. 
Freishtat, supra note 160. This would allow for different responses to different FRT applications, per-
haps requiring social networks to be more transparent and to enable users to easily switch data to com· 
petitors. James Temple, Facial Recognition Software's Privacy Concerns, SFGate.com (June 20, 2012, 
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.comlbusiness/article/Facial-recognition-software-s-privacy-concems-
3645779.php. 
439 MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note II, at 154-55. These authors anticipate a shift in 
regulatory frameworks away from consent and toward accountability for the uses of data. Jd. at 173. 
440 Id. at 158-59. This would be problematic for numerous reasons, including that culpability 
assumes that people have chosen a course of action and thus should be made responsible for it. Id. at 
163. 
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CONCLUSION 
The writing is on the wall. One day soon, "[y Jour phone - or in some 
years your glasses and, in a few more, your contact lenses - will tell you 
the name of that person at the party whose name you always forget .... Or 
it will tell the stalker in the bar the address where you live," or it will tell 
the police where you have been and where you are going.441 FRT is rapidly 
moving society toward a world in which the Constitution's scope needs to 
be meaningfully reformulated, else it risks irrelevance when it comes to 
individuals' ability to hide from the prying eyes of government. 442 The third 
party doctrine and the longstanding judicial rejection of a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in matters made public have depleted the Fourth Amend-
ment of vitality for purposes of establishing constitutional barriers to the 
government's use of FRT to profile and monitor individual citizens. Alt-
hough the Court has expressly affirmed protections for anonymous speech 
under the First Amendment, that doctrine has not been extended to address 
the harms that flow from dragnet-style surveillance. Yet every member of 
the modem Court has at some point recognized that technology necessitates 
a rethinking of traditional constitutional boundaries. 
This Article argued that existing First Amendment protections for an-
onymity should be brought to bear in assessing how Fourth Amendment 
doctrine can adapt to the challenges of modem surveillance methods. To-
day, the conglomerate of publicly available data is colossal and constantly 
expanding. Technology enables the government and private companies to 
identify patterns within such data which reveal new information that does 
not exist anywhere in isolation. As a consequence, information in the digital 
age is fundamentally distinct from information in the pre-digital age, in 
which the Court's Fourth Amendment doctrine evolved. This Article thus 
identified constitutionally derived guidelines for courts and lawmakers to 
consider in crafting judicial, legislative, and regulatory responses to the 
government's newfound capacity to create new information from store-
houses of data gleaned from social media sites, public cameras, and increas-
ingly sophisticated technologies like FRT. By giving these guidelines seri-
ous consideration, courts and lawmakers can tether foundational constitu-
tional protections against over-surveillance with the development of the 
law-law that is otherwise broken and outdated. 
441 Spencer, supra note 157 (quoting Professor Alessandro Acquisti). 
442 See Guttennan, supra note 103, at 681 (construing Katz as "adher[ing] to the basic detennina-
tion that fourth amendment protections must respond to technological developments"). 
